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ONE YEAR OF OUR FEDERAL RULES
ELMO IIUNTER*
I
"The twelve jurors were all writing very busily on slates. 'What are
they doing ?' Alice whispered to the Gryphon. 'They can't have anything
to put down yet, before the trial has begun.'
i'They're putting down their names,' the Gryphon whispered in
reply, 'for fear they should forget them before the end of the trial.' -'
Although the story doesn't tell us so, this dialogue between Alice and
the Gryphon may have referred to a federal trial any time prior to
September 16, 1939. Since then, however, the new federal rules have gone
into effectY There have been trials going on under them for over a year,
and it is hoped that the Gryphon, if asked again, would give Alice a
different view of federal procedure.
The history of the adoption of the rules, like that of every major
achievement in the legal fiel, 1, reveals a success gained only after a long
and tedious fight. The spark that started this sustained drive resulted
from Roscoe Pound's reading to an American Bar Association meeting
his treatise on "The Causes of Unc'ertainty and Delay in the Adminis-
tration of Justice. "3 A committee was set up by that association to improve
*Attorney, Kansas City. A.B., University of Missouri, 1936, LL.B., 19:18.
1. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND.
2. The authority for the federal rules is contained in 48 STAT. 106' (1 934),
28 U. S. C. § 723b (1935) (at law); 28 U. S. C. § 723c (1935) (union of law
and equity). The United States Supreme Court had the equity rule making
power from the beginning, I MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 10. The authority
for the United States Supreme Court to make rules for appellate practice is
contained in existing federal statutes, which are collected in Clark, Power of the
Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 HARV. L. REV.
1303.
3. (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 784.
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the situation revealed by Pound, and under the thirty year guidance ol'
Thomas AV. Shelton, of Virginia, it labored, seemingly in vain, in its
campaign of education to induce Congress to pass an act authorizing the
Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of Court to govern actions at law in
1he federal courts.
Just as this fight was about to be dropped for want of leadership, after
Shelton's death, Attorney General Cummings, as part of his program for
improving the administration of justice in the federal courts, espoused the
cause. As a result of the efforts of these two men, and of many others,
in Jule, 1934, Congress passed appropriate legislation, and the United
States Supreme Court appointed a highly capable and distinguished ad-
visory committee of fourteen members to draw up a set of proposed rules
to be submitted to that court. This committee was composed of eminent
practicing attorneys-and law professors, each of whom was recognized as
outstanding in his chosen field. Each brought to the committee the view-
point of his particular part of the profession. This committee very wisely
sought the suggestions and criticism of several thousands of leading at-
torneys and law groups. After many months of careful research,-the com-
mittee submitted to the Supreme Court its proposed list of new federal
rules.- The Supreme Court, after making a few changes, referred its results
to Congress which promptly gave approval. These rules, eighty-six in
number, simply, clearly, and concisely written, superseded literally thou-
sands of statutes, yet covered scarcely a hundred small pages. They had
been derived largely from present English rules, federal statutes, federal
equity rules, and from the best code rules of the code states. They reflected
the long and careful study that had gone into their making and represented
the best rules of each of the above mentioned groups. While no one juris-
diction had ever had a majority of them, all had been taken from some
jurisdiction where they had been given a practical and thorough trial.
In Rule One the purpose of these new rules is stated to be "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." To this
may be added another but unwritten purpose: to simplify procedure so
that the ordinary practitioner, not a specialist in federal procedure, can use
the federal courts without fear of technical pitfalls and as securely as he
can use his own state courts. This meant the removal of the main obstacle.
4. The Advisory Committee considered and formulated approximately ten
drafts over a course of two years. I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3.
I Vrol. r5
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the Conformity Act. Enacted as a result of the feeling of the members
of the bar that they preferred to follow as nearly as possible their local
practice in the federal courts, the Conformity Act slowly turned into a
boomerang for the state practitioner. As law and equity tended to unite,
the ideal of pure conformity was necessarily gone.' The act was held not
to apply to such matters as jurisdiction. It was applied to pleading and
procedure and not to matters of trial, thus leaving no conformity from the
time of going to trial on up through appeal. Whenever particular federal
statutes were passed, and thousands of them were passed, they, to that
extent, repealed or cut off conformity, and made for more confusion. Prac-
titioners remember that under the act there resulted as many distinct
and different systems of federal practice as states in the union, and that
there was a tendency to have as many systems as there were federal
districts. Federal practice fell exclusively into the hands of federal
specialists. If the everyday lawyer, in his everyday practice, got into a
federal court and presented his case on its merits it was due to pure luck,
or to a kindly judge. He could not possibly foresee the numerous technical
pitfalls that awaited him. The desire for a usable common practice in state
and federal courts as expressed in the Conformity Act was admittedly
a dismal failure, and there was heavy pressure for some kind of reform.
7
The desirability, however, of a usable common practice was stronger than
ever. Modern traveling means had greatly enlarged the sphere of business
of the judge and lawyer and lent impetus to their desire for a practical
common procedure. The result of this demand was the new rules based
upon a new idea of conformity, viz, that of having the state practice follow
a uniform federal system.
Sired with such practicality and expert preparation much was and
is to be expected of the new procedure. Yet the fate of these rules, their
usefulness and adaptability, depends to a very great extent on just how
sincerely the bar and bench co-operate to establish this desired uniformity
and to get away from the complex and technical habits of our former
procedure. History reminds us of the cold and unsympathetic treatment
5. REv. -STAT. § 914 (1878), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1935).
6. See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U. S. 235 (1922);
Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The Background (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 387; II. Pleadings & Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291; Clark, The
Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procpdre (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 443.
7. The cases in which the United States Supreme Court declared that
it was impossible for the federal courts to conform to the state procedure have
been collected and cited in an article by Tolman in 23 A. B. A. J. 971.
19401
3
Hunter: Hunter: One Year of Our Federal Rules
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
4 MISSOURI LAW REVIEV [Vol. 5
of the Field Code by the New York courts and bar, and the resultain.
complexity and inadaptability of. that code.8
It is the purpose of this article to point out the basic con'epts embodied
in the new procedure, and to review the cases for Ilhe early, formative
period to see what treatment the bench and bar have accorded these rules.
In doing this all of the relevant decisions handed down since the new rules
became effective have been studied, and as many of the important ones as
space permits will be specifically considered.
The first new concept under the federal rules, and no doubt the most
fundamental, is that expressed in Rules One and Two. Although new to
federal practice, these two rules follow in substance the usual iuitroductory
sections to code practice which provide for a single action and mode of
procedure for all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as eases in law
or equity. Thus we see the federal courts taking over the basic reform
of the New York Field Code ninety years later. No longer does the federal
system retain the antiquated common law theory of actions being' water-
tight compartments, with no transfer from one to the other. No longer
in federal courts will- the- orderly trial of a cause be delayed or defeated
by a party misnaming his theory and bringing his action on the "wrong
side" of the court. Today, if you show facts entitling you to relief you are
to get that relief, regardless of the question of form of action.
Aln early question raised concerning the new rules was whether or not
the old equity rules were superseded by the Act of June, 1934, granting
the rule-making power to the Supreme Court. The Act reads, "all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." This is best
interpreted to mean that both equity and law claims in conflict therewith
are of no further force or effect, and not just law claims alone. It would have
been better expressed by stating that the united rules shall supersede
inconsistent statutes, rules, and decisions, and the courts have so interpreted
the act.
Rule One purports to set out the area in which the federal rules are
operative and controlling. It states that the rules govern only procedure
in suits of a civil nature. This provision brings forward no new question.
8. See Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules, etc. (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 787, in which he describes the harsh reception of the Field Code.
See also, I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3.
9. The writer has received much help from the advance pamphlets of
decisions on the federal rules furnished to the federal courts by the United
States Attorney General's office.
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/7
ONE YEAR OF OUR FEDERAL RULES
There is much authority upon the question of what is procedure and what
are suits of a civil nature, and new fact situations must rest upon such
precedents."0
The next section of the rules to be considered is that titled generally
"Commencement of Action." Under this classification come Rules Three,
Four, Five and Six. As this section deals primarily with the meehanics
of getting your case into court, of filing your papers, and of computation
of time, an extended discussion of the background of each rule is not
warranted. Rule Three states: "A civil action is commenced by filing" a
complaint with the court." Three reasons make it imperative that the
precise moment of the commencement of the suit be known. First, you
must know when jurisdiction vests in the tribunal; second, in certain
cases it is necessary to determine priorities; third, and very important,
is the effect of the Statute of Limitations. Almost all Statutes of Limita-
tions require the suit to be "commenced" or "begun" within a prescribed
number of years after the accrual of the right. Not every state defines
commencement of the suit in the same way. The Advisory Committee, itself,
concluded that Statutes of Limitations are matters of substantive law,
and raised the question whether the Supreme Court, under its power to
make rules of procedure, could make a rule defining what constitutes the
beginning of a suit within the meaning of a state or federal Statute of
Limitations. The Committee put a caveat in the notes to the bar on that
point. However, it would seem that each forum should be able to define
when an action begins as a part of its procedure and then look to the state
Statute of Limitations to see what the time limitation is.
Rule Four, stating that process is to issue at once after the filing of
the petition, creates close ',armony with those states designatinig issuance
and delivery of process to the server as the date of the beginning of the
action. Provision is made for service by a specially appointed server when
substantial savings in travel fees will result. Section (f) of Rule Four deals
with the territorial limits of effective service. Prior to these rules some
10. For leading cases upon the questions of what is procedure, and what
are civil proceedings, see, Waynian v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825);
Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875); Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q. B. D. :129
(1881); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221 (1882); Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329
(U. S. 1835); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1875); Madisonville Traction Co.
v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239 (1905); Lever v. Kneale, [1937] 2 K. B.
87. See also, Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power
Granted United States Suipreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise (1935)
21 A. B. A. J. 404.
1940]
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federal statutes provided that process might be served anywhere within
the limits of the particular state wherein the federal court sat, while other
statutes allowed service only within the particular district, and not through-
out the state. Some question has been raised as to whether this is merely
a procedural change or one of substantive right. The Advisory Committee
referred it to the Supreme Court in a note, and the Supreme Court accepted
the rule. It does seem that the rule states only that when the court has
jurisdiction and venue, its process reaches the confines of the state, and is
thus procedural. With Rule Four, Rule Eighty-two must be considered.
Rule Eighty-two states that jurisdiction and venue are unaffected by the
new rules. Rule Eighty-Two is really surplusage, as jurisdiction and venue
are matters of substantive right and not pleading, practice, or procedure,
and thus are beyond the scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. The remainder of Rule Four deals with how and upon whom service
may be made.
Rule Five provides generally for the serving upon the opponent of
practically all the ordinary papers that arise in the suit, including specifical-
ly- motions, written not-ces, appyearances, demands;- offers- of- judgment;
designation of record on appeal, and similar papers.
Rule Six is a general rule dealing with time computation and time
enlargement. Its most important and new feature is that it provides that
the expiration of the term of court does not affect the power of the court
to do any act or take any proceeding in any action pending before it. This
provision removes an old, technical provision with only historical justifica-
tion. which resulted in so called "hard-law."
Highly important is the new philosophy underlying the pleading rules.
As expressed by a member of the Advisory Committee, Rules Seven to
Twenty-five inclusive are the quintessence of the whole system, and if you
can agree with the principles expressed in them, you will probably agree
with the principles declared in any of the other rules.' This philosophy
calls for or allows very general pleading with recourse to the liberal dis-
covery process for specific information or evidence. There can be no doubt
but that Judge Charles E. Clark, reporter for the committee and then Dean
of the Yale U~niversity Law School, greatly influenced the Advisory Corn-
11. See the address of Judge Clark, reported in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVE-
LAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (Am. Bar Ass'n 1938) 220 ff.; Cf. CLARK,
CODE PLEADING (1928); Clark, The Handmaid of Justice (1938) 23 WASI.
U. L. Q. 297; Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-
Underlying Philosophy Em bodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New
Procedur-e (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 976.
[Vol. 51
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mittee and the Supreme Court in the formation of these particular rules
on pleading. Judge Clark has long declared his belief that the idea that
you can pin the other party down by pleading that demands a specific.
narrow, and technical issue is an idle dream as proved by practice. In
his writings lie clearly revealed that the trend has been away from special-
ized, detailed pleading. The beginning of this trend, Judge Clark stated.
resulted from the reaction to the Hilary Rules, England's first step in
procedural reform. Stephen, who wrote those rules, was embued with the
theory that the desirable thing was more, better, and harsher rules calling
for highly particularized and technical pleadings. The result was such a
miscarriage of justice that England turned toward more lenient pleading,
culminating in the English Judicature Act and the union of law and equity.
Furthermore, although there were a few parts of common law pleading
where a narrow issue was called for. the most general and most used actions
were fairly broad in their allegations. Every recent trend in pleading re-
form has been in this same general direction of simplicity, generality and
flexibility of pleading. The federal rules carry still farther this philosophy.
A study of the pleading and discovery provisions will bring the conclusion
that the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court accepted Clark's
philosophy that it is not the function of the pleadings to prove your case
or to supply the place of evidence, as by trapping your opponent into
admissions, but that the primary functions are, first, to distinguish the case
from all others so that it can be properly routed through the tribunal; and,
secondly, to serve as a basis for the binding force of the judgment through
the application of the principle of res adjudicata. For that purpose it is
clear that general pleadings are sufficient. -12 If you need more information
from your opponent in o,'der to answer or to further develop your case,
the new rules provide a more direct and simple way than by trying to
force your opponent to say through pleadings that which he wishes to avoid.
12. Clark, supra note 11, 23 A. B. A. J. 976. For further evidence of the
intended generality of pleading under the new rules, note the form drawn up and
promulgated with the new -rules. They illustrate the general simplicity ex-
pected in the pleading. For example, Form Nine is a complaint for egligence
in an ordinary automobile case. The entire statement of the accident. is: "On
June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Mass-
achusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who
was then crossing said highway." How different this is from the usual pleading
of such cases wherein the attorney puts in several pages of set allegations
covering everything from failure to sound horn to defective brakes. Form Nine
is no radical innovation. It is copied directly from the official form in Mass-
achusetts (MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 231, § 147, form 13). Massachusetts in
turn got it from the common law form of the action of trespass from Chitty. See
2 CHITTY, PLEADING (9th Am. ed. 1844) 846 et seq.
1940]
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This better way is to use the discovery process designed to give you in-
formation which you can use to prepare your case and which can be used
as evidence in the trial of your case if relevant. All you need do is to
send around a series of relevant questions to your opponent for him to
answer, and he is expected to answer to the extent that tie answers are not
privileged. Appeals in the past have involved a far greater number of
procedure points than questions of substantive law. Reversals and retrials
for error of procedure have greatly outnumbered those for all other
causes." The more rigid and precise these procedural requirements are,
the more grounds they furnish counsel for appeal. The same is true of
requirements in pleading. That the Committee and Court recognized this
is shown by the brevity of statement allowed. Of course, just how ex-
plicit each particular pleading must be in each case depends upon the
individual -conception of the trial judge as to just how much detail lie be-
lieves is called for under the new rules. It is here especially that the pur-
pose of the rules can be greatly helped or hampered. Reference to the cases
will reveal this individual treatment.
Another provision along the same line provides that the pleadings be
cut short fairly soon. 4 No reply is necessary unless the court orders it,
or unless there is a-counterclaimn Furthermore, the old belief that you are
entitled to raise suecessively and seriatim all the objections you have, though
they be only in abatement, has been softened a great deal. Certain objec-
tions must be included in one motion or they are waived. The demurrer,
the time honored instrument of delay, has been abolished, and its place
taken by a motion, which can be stripped of its dilatory effect by the court
deferring it and certain like motions for hearing at the trial. This the
court should do unless it thinks a preliminary hearing will terminate the
case. Liberal provisions for amendment and correction of error are made.
Rule Thirteen governing compulsory and permissive counterclaims
and cross-claims is substantially Equity Rule Thirty broadened to include
legal as well as equitable claims."5 It carries out the modern tendency of
very liberal provisions concerning both the subject matter of, and the
parties to. a counterclaim or cross-claim. It is another move to limit the
13. See Tolman, Historical Beginnings of Procedural Reform Movement in
This Country (1936) 23 A. B. A. J. 783.
14. See Pike, Objections to Pleadings Under the New Federal Rules of
Ciril Procedure (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 50.
15. For a discussion of matter of federal jurisdiction and venue in regard
to cross-claims and counterclaim, see Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdic-
tional Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393.
(Vol. -5
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number of possible lawsuits to as few suits as practical. Remembering
that any claim which a defendant has against the plaintiff, or any claim
which a third-party defendant has against the third-party plaintiff is a
counterclaim, and that a cross-claim is a .laim by a party against a co-party,
it is noteworthy that cross-claims are never compulsory but are governed
solely by permissive provisions. There was some suggestion to the Ad-
visory Committee that all counterclaims of whatever nature, whether arising
out of the same transactions or not, be treated as compulsory. Since this
would force a party to submit all his claims to a forum of his opponent's
choosing, often complicate pleadings, and force a party to choose while
he may still be in doubt as to the existence of certain claims and the ad-
visibility of litigating them at that time, it was decided best to allow him to
use his own judgment as to whether unrelated claims should be pleaded."
The rules governing joinder of claims aid in rounding out the picture
of a simple, flexible system. Rule Eighteen provides for joinder in one
action of all claims which a plaintiff or defendant has against the other.
This allowance of unlimited joinder of actions does away with the narrow
method of the common law and codes of breaking up a set of operative
facts into causes of action with joinder of actions problems. Under the
common law there was no sensible rationale as to what actions could be
joined.17 An action in trespass and an action in case could not be joined
although they involved the same underlying facts. Yet totally unrelated
trespasses could be pleaded in the same action. This illogical result came
from using as the joinder test the question of whether or not the actions
came under the same writ. Trial convenience was disregarded. Equity
courts were more practical and used a test based somewhat upon trial
convenience with a view toward settling the entire controversy in one suit.'-
Under the various state codes the rules and decisions as to what could be
properly joined were narrow and often illogical.15 The federal rules, in
recognizing that the problem of joinder of actions is solely one of trial con-
venience and that it does not matter how many causes of action or plead
if the court can order a separate trial whenever practical. are to b., greatly
commended.
16. For discussion, see I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 669.
17. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (3rd ed. 1923) § 202; 1 TIDD'S
PRACTICE (2d Am. ed. from 8th London ed.) 10, wherein is discussed the im-
possibility of rationalizing the common law rule.
18. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS (8th cd. 1870) § 278 ff.
19. See 2 MOORE, op. cit. sup'ra note 2, at 2111ff; Sunderland, Joinder of
Actions (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 571.
1940]
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Rules Nineteen and Twenty deal with necessary and permissive joinder
of parties. Under the common law, joinder of parties was allowed only
if the parties had joint interests. The idea of a liberal allowance of joinder
of parties in order to clear up an entire dispute came from the equity
practice. In 1848, when the New York Code was adopted, the codifiers
stated that they were attempting to apply the equity rule to all actions.
They were unfortunate in stating that there could be joinder only when
there was an "interest in the subject of the action and in the relief to be
demanded." If instead of the word "and" the word "or" had been used
the rule would have then approximated the equity rule. The courts have
construed the rule to require both an interest in the subject of the action and
in the relief demanded, although the courts have tried to soften this narrow
resulted by liberalizing their conception of the two interests demanded. The
new rules completely avoid the problems incurred under the Codes and
premise the relevant rule upon whether or not there is a common question
of law or fact, arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions of occurrences. A recent law review article 20 raised the ques-
tion or whether or not the new rules should have provided for absolutely
free joinder of parties as in joinder of claims. Such a provision would
" undou tedly -have- carried -to- its -Atimate- conclusion- the philosophy that
all matters in litigation between the parties should be brought out for
disposition at one time. Section (b) of Rule Forty-two gives the court
the discretionary power to order separate trials, or to make any other
order necessary to prevent delay or injustice. Rule Twenty-two concerns
relief similar to that accorded by actions in the nature of a bill of inter-
pleader. It provides that persons having claims against the plaintiff which
do or may expose the plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be in-
terpleaded. This does away with the old equitable interpleader require-
ments,' as that of no interest in the stake, and seems to allow what could
be done under the general joinder rule.:" The federal interpleadr act
with its process that may run throughout the country is specifically con-
tinued.
Rule Twenty-three concerns class suits. It is the equitable principle
of class suits stated more clearly and in a more usable form.22
20. Comment (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 462.
21. Clark, supra note 11, CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, at 263.
22. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions (1939) 32 ILL. L. REV. 307,
Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment (1938) 32 ILL.
L. REv. 555; Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules (1937) 22 MINN. L. REV.
34; Clark, supra note 11, CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, at 264.
I Vol. 5
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lhue 'l'wenty-threc (a) is divided into three parts. Several law re-
view articles"-: by eminent professors have appeared recently concerning
this rule, and it. is the opinion of these authors that as to the first and
second subdivisions of the rule, matters of jurisdiction could be held to be
settled by the representative, and his citizenship would be controlling, and
the judgment rendered would be binding upon those whom he represents.
As to the third subdivision, those writers believe that that provision
amounts only to a kind of joinder, and that neither jurisdiction nor citizen-
ship depends upon the representative alone, but upon all represented, and
those not personally in the suit would not be bound by the judgment. Part
(b) deals with secondary actions by shareholders. It is but a restatement
of Equity Rule Twenty-seven. Although it might be considered as affecting
substantive rights, if of first impression, the Supreme Court has regarded
it otherwise in old Equity Rule Ninety-four, r e-enacted in Equity Rule
Twenty-seven.14 Part (c) deals generally whh dismissals or compromises.
Rule Twenty-four concerns intervention. It is intended to be only a
classification of the existing law on that subject.2 5
Rule Twenty-five concerning substitution of parties, is but a carrying
over of the provisions of the equity rules, and the statutory rules with a
few additions.
Rule Fourteen, concerning Third Party Practice, brings to federal
procedure a modern innovation in law and equity, although well known
in admiralty 15ractice..2 6 Its main objective is to facilitate the complete
disposition of the whole controversy between the parties to it in one
proceeding. It brings another sensible shortcut to our system. It had boen
developed and used in England and In some American states in a re-
stricted form, usually allowhin the citing in by the defendant of some one
liable over to the defendant for the judgment.2 7 Under the new federal
rule. patterned much after the admiralty rule, the practice is more liberal.
The defendant may cite in a person liable to him or to the plaintiff. Thu.s,
wherever joint and several liability exists the whole controversy can be
23. See note 22, supra.
24. See the address of the Hon. William D. Mitchell, Chairman ol the
Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court, reported in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (Am. Bar Assn. 1938) 184.
25. See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention: I. The Right to Intervene
and Reorganization (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 565; Federal Intervention: II. The
Procedure, Status, and Federal Jurisdictional Requirements (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 898.
26. United States Supreme Court Admiralty Rules (1920) Rule 56.
27. See official notes to Rule 14, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; See I
MOORE, OP. cit. supra note 2, at 741 ft.
11
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settled between all the parties in one proceeding. Tile same result may
be obtained in situations where contribution among the parties is allowed.
Rule Fourteen does not, of course, abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive
rights. Some substantive right, such as that of reimbursement, indemnity,
or contribution, must exist. Then Rule Fourteen expedites the presenta-
tion, and in some cases accelerates, that right. It not only saves time and
money that might be spent on a second trial, but also assures consistent
results from identical or similar evidence. Whether or not one may im-
plead rests in the discretion of the court. The third party defendant does
not merely by the impleader.become an original defendant. True, if the
.defendant impleads some one liable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may
amend his pleadings to assert a claim against the impleaded party, but
he i. not compelled to do so.
28
A serious -question raised by Rule Fourteen is whether or not the third
party claim requires independent jurisdictional grounds or whether it
should be regarded as an ancillary claim and hence remove jurisdictional
and venue difficulties. Commentators have urged the latter view." This
was probabr- the intent of the Advisory Committee, for official form
twenty-two of the new rules, giving an example of third party complaint.
unlike- the form for origb..aLcomplaintsz omits any allegation of jurisdiction.
The question was raised at the Cleveland symposium. and others, as to
how this rule would affect the liability insurance compamies.' The opinion
seemed to be that where the insurer appears for the defendant and takes
charge of the defense, under the ordinary policy providing that the insurer
must fully cooperate with the insured in the defense, and has not dis-
claimed his contingent liability to the defendant, it is not possible for the
insurer to be made a party merely because of that liability over. On the
other hand, if there is question as to the ultimate liabilit." of the insurer
for the claim, under his contract with defendani. he can he vitd in.
Of course, whether such citing in will he allowed rests in the somd dis-
cretion of the court, and it should act to present bias from entering need-
lessly imto the trial.
Another very important section of the new rules is that dealing with
dis~covery. At common law there was not very much opportunity for
28. I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 743.
29. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II. Pleadings and
Pat-ties (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1291, 1322; Shulman and Jacgerman, Some J'irb:-
dictioemal Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393, 421.
30. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (Ani.
Bar Assn. 1938) 252.
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discovery. The common law system grew up in a "sporting" society, and
much of this game theory of hiding each party's position from the other
became a part of a lawsuit. One never knew what were the real and the
false issues, or what diplomatic diversions were promulgated.3 1 Under many
of our c'ode practice a.t. with their restricted discovery provisions, this
idea lingers on. Prior to the new rules there was practically no provision
for discovery in federal practice. There was recourse to only four possible
sources, and they were very limited. Two of these sources were statutes
which were in part drafted solely to aid in obtaining proof, and that was the
condition precedent to using them.2 Both were very limited in scope and
use even for evidentiary purposes. The other two sources were equity
rules. Equity Rule Forty-seven authorized the taking of deposition of
named witnesses for use at trial "for good and exceptional cause for
departing from the general rule." The purpose of this rule was not dis-
covery but proof. It had practically no value as a discovery process.
Equity Rule Fifty-eight was the only provision in the entire federal system
that was intended primarily for discovery. It provided for general dis-
covery, discovery of documents, and admissions. But it was a very re-
stricted, inadequate, and ineffective rule. Written interrogatories were
required. and there was no provision for oral examination. "Evasive
answers were easy to draft and were the vogue. Furthermore, the scope of
the rule was extremely narrow. Its provisions were available only to as-
certain facts relating to a party's own case, and not to that of his adversary.
Only parties could be interrogated, and not witnesses. And the admissions
section applied only to execution and genuiness of documents and not to
the admission of facts in general. No resort was possible to state discovery
statutes under the Confor ity Act because the federal statutes were held
to provide a complete system.3
In keeping with the philosophy stated in the pleading discussion, the
new rules purport to provide a systematic, complete, and liheral scheme of
discovery before trial. All restrictions are removed on the right to take
depositions, whether they are to be used for purpose of disovery or
evidence. The party or witness may be examined regarding, a" matter
31. 3 WIG.MORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1845 et seq.: McCash, Discovery
Before Trial (1934) 20 IowA L. REV. 68.
,2. 17 STAT. 89 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 644 (1934), concerning dedimus potes-
tatem and perpetration of testimony. 17 STAT. 89 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 639 (1934),
con'erning- depositions de beuv e.gse.
33. E." parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 723 (1885).
19,40 ]
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not privileged which is relevant to the suit. To protect the party to bv
examined, the court, upon motion of the party and for cause shown, may
restrict the scope of the examination. The deposition may be taken after
the answer is served, as of course; and before answer, by leave of courl.
Disclosure may be had as to the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts, or documents. Perpetuation of testimony is
allowed. A very extensive and effective discovery by way of admissions
of particular facts and documents is provided. Physical and mental
examinations are authorized in certain circumstances. Effective methods
of mechanics for taking the depositions either orally or by written inter-
rogatories are provided. The parties themselves may stipulate in writing'
that the depositions can be taken before any person, at any time, or place,
upon any notice, and in any inanner. The admissibility of depositions as
evidence is more liberal. Subpoenas may be employed in connection with
the taking of depositions. The court has ample power to assess heavy
penalties for failure to keep good faith with these discovery and evidentiary
provisions. The result is an excellent method for an early disclosure of the
real points of dispute between the parties, and of obtaining and making
admissible evidence. The provisions abandon the supposition that thc
pleadings are the only or chief basis of preparation for trial. In turn this
is in keeping with the view that the pleadings are only to notify the
opposing party as to the general nature of the claim or defense, and to
reveal enough to allow the case to be properly routed through the tribunal.
and to allow the principle of res adjudicata to be applied.
As previously stated, in the ordinary case upon the pleadings a.s usually
drawn there are many matters apparently in issue which are not actually
in issue at all. MHuch waste of time and money results, and confusioI
abounds in preparing to meet such issues. We have seen that the pleading'
and discovery provisions of the new rules are designed primarily to
remedy this situation. The third, and perhaps the most practical. of the
provisions designed to alleviate such dilatory and camouflaging methods is
that providing for pretrial procedure, which creates a machinery whereby
the court as well as the parties may participate in a thorough pretrial
investigation and sifting of the issues and evidence, with a view toward
the trial thereof, if necessary. The parties, if left alone, may not arrive
at any agreements as to the real issues and the expedition of the trial of
the case, even with the aid of the liberal discovery and evidentiary pro-
visions found in Rules Twenty-six to Thirty-seven. The origin of this
pretrial procedure was in England, where a similar system of preliminary
[ Vol. 5
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hearings for discovery and identification of the actual issues was de-
veloped." Several American jurisdictions, notably Boston, Cleveland,
Detroit, and Los Angeles, had already demonstrated its success by actual
use.*', The federal rule provides that in any action the court may in its
discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference to consider, first, the simplification of the issues and the elimina-
tion of those not really in dispute; second, the necessity or desirability
of amendments to the pleadings; third, the possibility of obtaining ad-
missions of facts and documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; fourth,
the necessity of and the limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
fifth, the advisibility of a preliminary reference to a master; and lastly,
other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action. At the con-
elusion of the conference the court is required to enter an order reciting
the action taken at the conference, the agreements effected, and oiher such
matter which is to govern the trial to come. The success of this rule de-
pends to a very great extent upon the use put it by the trial judges and
the cooperation of the attorneys. It is already proving very successful
in federal practice." It should go far to remove sham, surprise, delay,
expense, and confusion from the preparation and -trial of a case. It should
not only expedite litigation but also encourage settlements by revealing
the real value of claims.
Rules Thirty-eight to Fifty-three, inclusive, in keeping with the
previous rules, provide for the doing away with technicalities during trial,
and make for a fair, thorough, and speedy trial. Some of the more notable
of these provisions are: First, the constitutional right to trial by jury re-
mains inviolate, but in order to remove confusion Rule Thirty-eight pro-
vides that you must serve in writing a demand for a jury trial or you
waive your right to one. Even though you have waived the right to a jury
trial, the court in its discretion, upon motion, may grant one. Further, no
longer when both parties move for a directed verdict is the right to a jury
34. See official notes to Rule 27, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
35. Detroit, faced with a docket of 4965 cases in 1935, disposed of 40.6
percent at pretrial hearings. In 1936 Detroit was faced with a docket of 5834
cases and 49.4 percent were disposed of at pretrial hearings. In 1937 Detroit
disposed of 55.1 percent of its docket in the same way. For a discussion of the
data and the pretrial procedure administration see Sunderland, The Theory and
Practice of Pre-trial Procedure (1937) 36 MICH. L. REv. 215.
36. See discussion by Judge Sweeney of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Mass., entitled Expert Use of Pretrial Docket in Federal
Court, in (1939) 23 JOUR. OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 11, wherein
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trial waived. No longer does a party waive his right to offer further
evidence by moving for a dismissal on the ground that upon the law and
the facts the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Second, the voluntary
non-suit. so unfair and overused in many states is sensibly restricted
in Rule Forty-one. The right to a voluntary non-suit and its effect is clearly
defined. Third, proof of official documents is made easy. Dean Wigmore
had written the Advisory Committee disclosing the confusion resultant
from the innumerable federal statutes upon the subject. Rule Forty-four
is a codification of the statutes, and clearly states what need be and can
be done. Fourth, Rule Forty-two declares the broad power of the court
to order consolidation for trial of cases involving the same question of law
or fact, and the power to order separate trial in cases where there are
too many issues in one suit. Fifth, provision is made for the selection of
alternate jurors before trial, thus removing fear of mistrial because of the
loss of incapacity of a juror. Sixth, there is now a check, by use of in-
terrogatories, on the illogicality or unreasonableness of the verdict, with
provision for granting of partial new trials in certain circumstances.
Seventh. the clearing up of the problem left by the cases of Slocurm v. New
York Life Insurance Company3 and Baltinzore & Caroline Line v. Red-
nam.3S Those twa cases left it doubtful whether or not the trial judge
could, after verdict, go back and grant a motion for a directed verdict
previously made. The Rednzan case seemed to indicate that there was no
violation of the right to a jury trial by granting the motion in the form of
a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict, if the trial judge
had taken the original motion under advisement. The new rules provide
that the motion for a directed verdict is automatically reserved, and a
party can move for the entry of a judgment ton ob.tante verdict aiy
time within ten days after verdict. The trial judge can grant that motion,
and if he is wrong in granting or refusing it the appellate court .an (,or-
rect his ruling. Eighth, the requirement for taking formal ex.eptioji to
rulings is abolished. One need only make a clear objection and state his
reason therefor. Ninth, and lastly, the rules contain a very liberal evidence
rule. under which the evidence is admissible in federal courts if it would
be admissible either under a federal statute, under federal decisions in
equity practice, or under state statutes or decisions. The Advisory Com-
mittee in formulating this rule stated that they believed that there should
37. 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
38. 295 U. S. 654 (1935).
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be drawn up in code form a single set of evidence rules, but that some
other conuittee should do that work." It is interesting to note that the
American Law Institute has recently announced it is undertaking to
formulate a Modern Code of Evidence with Professor Edmund Al. lorgan
of Harvard Law School, as reporter.4" IlIe will have the help of Dean John
I1. Wigmore, and others. This code is being formulated for the purpose
of adoption by the federal or state jurisdictions if they wish to do so.
Rule. Forty-three (b) allows a party to call on an adverse party and
interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him as
though he had been called by the adverse party. Rule Forty-three also
specifically limits the scope of cross-examination to the subject matter in
chief when a party calls an adverse party or an unwilling or hostile wit-
ness. There is no mention as to what the rule would be in other situations,
yet there is little doubt but that the former federal practice of limiting
cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination is con-
tinued. When the Advisory Committee was drafting the final report
it inserted a rule allowing cross-examination on any question material
to the case, and the Supreme Court struck that rule out. It could only
have intended by such action to retain the former rule.
Equity Rule Forty-six, providing that if evidence was offered and
refused by the court, a record must be made of it so that the appellate
court could look to it and enter whatever decree or order the lower court
ought to have entered on that evidence, is now Rule Forty-three (c). Rule
Fifty-two states that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous and that the court must make findings of fact and state them and
the conclusions of law. This is in substance the former equity rule.4' The
former rule at law provided that the findings of the court had the effect
of a verdict and on review the findings could not be set aside if there was
substantial evidence to support them.4 - The appellate court could not
decide the findings were wholly against the weight of the evidence. Cer-
tainly the rule should be the same when the judge finds the facts regardless
of whether it is in an action at law or in equity. This new federal rule
removes that difference. It further provides that the findings of a master
so far as adopted by the court shall be considered as the findings of the
39. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 186.
40. (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 380.
41. See Equity Rule 701/, as amended Nov. 25, 1935, and 24 STAT. 506
(1887), 28 U. S. C. § 764 (1934).
42. 13 STAT. 501 (1865), 28 U. S. C. §§ 773, 875 (1934).
J 940 ]
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court. Rule Fifty-two, also concerning masters, is based largely on the
equity rules.43 The master, like the judge in jury cases must also report
all evidence offered, with his grounds of exclusion. In non-jury cases he
must file the evidence with his report. In jury trial cases the evidence
is never reported, and the findings are only evidence for the jury to
consider.4
Under the sections concerning judgments the majority of the pro-
visions will be found to be patterned after the usual code practice. Most
noticeable are the provisions concerning summary judgments and declara-
tory judgments.
Summary judgments have been used extensively in England for over
half a century and in many of our states.4: Our federal courts under
the Conformity Act had recognized the state summary judgment acts.
Most of those state acts were much too limited in scope and did not apply
to all actions. Summary judgment procedure under the new rules is just a
simple method for promptly disposing of any action in which there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. It cares for those situations wherein
the pleadings show the existence of a formal dispute, which may not be
an actual dispute because it may be an assertation or denial which the
pleader knows he cannot prove, or which has no substance. Under the
present federal procedure, upon application, the court looks at the plead-
ings, depositions on file, if any; admissions on file, if any; and affidavits,
if any, on- file either in support or in opposition to the motion. If no
genuine issue is found and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, such judgment will be rendered. The constitutional right to
a jury trial is not violated, for if there is no issue to go to the jury there
is no right to a jury trial. Rule Fifty-six (d) provides that in case the
summary judgment is not rendered the hearing shall serve as a pre-trial
hearing in accordance with Rule Sixteen.
Rule Fifty-seven is the Declaratory Judgment rule, and carries over
into our new federal practice the provisions of the fairly recent fetz,,ral
statute for declaratory judgments-10 Rule Fifty-seven adds to the avail-
43. See notes 41 and 42, supra.
44. For constitutionality of rule see Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300
(1920): Graffis v. Woodward, 96 F. (2d) 329 (1938).
45. See official notes to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the
history and nature of the summary judgment procedure and citations of state
szatu-e.S see, Clark and Samenow, The Suimmary Judgmeut (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
423.
46. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1934) ; Judicial Code § 274d (1915).
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ability of' that declaratory judgment act which has already proven very
effective in practice. The rule was worked out in collaboration with Pro-
fessor Borchard of the Yale Law School, who had aided in the drafting of
the federal statute on the subject.17  Inasmuch as a controversy often
involves only an issue of law or undisputed or relatively undisputed facts,
the declaratory judgment practice frequently operates in the nature of a
summary judgment proceeding.4 Both the summary judgment proceeding
and the deelaratory judgment proceeding are of great value in expediting
litigation and saving needless cost4
Rule Fifty-nine, concerning new trials, incorporates those provisions
for new trials that exist at common law and for hearings in equity. The
Advisory Committee wisely recognized the practical impossibility of at-
tempting to set out the results of the many statutes and decisions that
affect the granting of new trials, or to formulate specific rules.
Rule Sixty deals with relief from judgments or orders. Rule Sixty-
one states the effect of harmless error and specifically orders the court
to disregard at all stages of the proceeding all errors not affecting the
substantial rights of the parties. Rule Sixty-two deals with the stay of
proceedings. Prior to this rule the subject was in a very confused state
because of several federal statutes that together failed to make up any
consistent system. The Advisory Committee took the provisions of all
these federal statutes, incorporated them, and added to them so as to fill
in the former gaps.50
Rules Sixty-four and Sixty-nine concerning seizure of person or
property, and executions, adopt the federal law which provided that if
there are existing United States Statutes they are to be applied; if not,
local practice is to govern. The applicable state law is specifically stated
to be that of the time when the remedy is sought. Rules Sixty-five and
Sixty-six are largely re-enactments of the previous practice. Rule Sixty-
seven is designed to continue in effect various scattered statutory pro-
visions for deposit in court of moneys in certain eases. Rule Sixty-eight,
on offer of judgment, is new to the federal practice except to the extent
47. Clark, supra note 11, CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, at 323.
48. See official Notes to Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. For a discussion of the practice of declaratory judgment, see BORCIARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934), pertinent cases on the declaratory judgment
statute are: Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937); Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
50. Clark, supra note 11, CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, at 325; see official notes to
Rule 62, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1940)
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the federal courts in certain states followed the state practice. It is based
upon those state statutes and affords a means of stopping the running-up
of costs when the defendant admits that part of the claim of the plaintiff
is good, but intends to contest the balance claimed. By making an offer
of judgment of the amount he admits is due he relieves himself of costs
as to such admitted amount which would otherwise ordinarily accrue there-
after, unless the plaintiff recovers more than the offer. If the plaintiff
recovers more than the offer of the defendant, the defendant must pay all
costs just as though he had not made any offer. If the offer of judgment
is not accepted it is not admissible at the trial as an admission by the offeror,
and he is free to contest the whole claim.
Rule Seventy, entitled "Judgment for Specific Acts; Vesting Title,"
is important and contains much that is new to federal practice. It concerns
situations where the defendant is ordered to do something and does not do
it, and perhaps removes himself from the jurisdiction of the court. Rule
Seventy provides that if a writ of attachment or sequestration against his
property or adjudging him in contempt does not accomplish the ordered
act, the court may, when the property is in its jurisdiction, divest him of
the title and vest it in the plaintiff by virtue of its own order. The court
may also appoint some officer to do the act in behalf of the recalcitrant
defendant. Thus two methods are provided by which the court may pass
title to either real or personal property without participation of the owner.
There was much controversy among the Advisory Committee as to whether
or not a federal court judgment could pass title to property, that ordinarily
being a state question.!" After much study the Advisory Committee sent
the rule to the Supreme Court, which adopted it.5"
Rules Seventy-two to Seventy-six, inclusive, concern appeals. Prior
to these new rules in order to take an appeal to a federal court of appeal,
you had to file a petition for leave to appeal, including with it an assign-
ment of errors, and obtain *an order from the district judge allowing th,
appeal. Then a citation had to be issued and served on the respondent
advising him to appear in the appellate court within forty days. Under thir
51. See the address of Mr. Robert G. Dodge, also a member of the Advisory
Committee, reported in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
RULES (Am. Bar Assn. 1938) 328, 329.
52. Ibid. For authority that should aid in sustaining Rule 70, see HUSTON,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY (1915) cC. 1, 5; 1 CHAFEE and SIMPSON,
CASES ON EQUITY (1934) 70; Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U. S. 74 (1888); Clark
v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (U. S. 1839); Clarke v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 62 F. (2d)
440 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) cert. denied. 290 U. S. 629 (1933). The problem is
discussed at length by Evans, Problems in the Enforcement, of Federal .Iudg,teliis
(1939) 4 Mo. L. RE. 19.
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new rules tte mechanics of taking an appeal are much more simple. The
idea that an appeal is entirely a new case is gone. No longer need a citation
be issued and served. You merely file with the clerk of the district court
a notice of appeal. This is the only jurisdictional act. The clerk then
notifies the other parties. The manner of making up the record also has
been greatly simplified. Rule Seventy-five does not require the narrative
form of record nor forbid its use. It allows a party to offer a narrative
statement and permits his adversary to reject it and substitute the question
and answer form. If such rejection is unreasonable and causes added
expense, such expense may be placed by the court upon the rejecting party.
Inasmuch as the virtues of the narrative form of testimony have long
been questioned by the bar and bench alike, this provision should be most
welcome.1
3
In considering the rules governing appeal to the Supreme Court the
Advisory Committee wanted to use the same system as that used in taking
appeals to the circuit courts of appeal. However, the Committee was a
bit diffident about suggesting to the Supreme Court that it did not like
its system, so the Committee prescribed the existing system on appeals
from the district court to the Supreme Court, hoping that the Supreme
Court would ask it to revise that and adopt the method of appeals to the
circuit court of appeals. However, the Supreme Court did not do it, and
to take a direct appeal to the Supreme Court you must follow the old
practice, codified in Rule Seventy-two, of filing your petition, your assign-
nient of errors, getting an order allowing you to appeal, having a citation
issued, and so on." Rule Eighty-one sets out those civil proceedings to
which the new rules do not apply, or apply only in part. That rule also
abolishes the writs of scire facias and nawndarnus, but in the appropriate
cases relief by motion or other proper action is provided for. Section (c)
provides that these rules apply to civil actions removed to the district courts
of the United States from the state courts and govern all procedure after
removal. Repleading is not necessary unless the court so orders.
Rule Eighty-two states that which has often already been referred
to and discussed in connection with other rules. It provides that the new
rules are not to extend or limit jurisdiction or venue.
Rule Eighty-three provides that in all cases not pravided for by rule
53. Griswold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals
(1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 482; Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases (1937)
23 VA. L. REv. 766.
54. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 359.
1940]j
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the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not incon-
sistent with these rules. This provision closes all gaps in the rules. It
prevents any part of the Conformity Act from surviving. It permits judges
to decide the unusual or minor procedural problems that arise, and cares
for situations that can't be forecast. However, it was the intention of the
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court that this power not be used
to add to or complicate the simple procedure by the rules. In line with
this, Chief Justice Hughes' report of the 1938 conference of the senior
circuit judges of the federal courts, discloses that each senior circuit judge
is to communicate with his respective district judges to secure uniformity
of local rules and to keep them in line and in spirit with these new federal
rules.5 -With such a step being taken there is little fear that local court
rules will subvert the spirit and purpose of this new code. In conclusion,
it can be justly said that these new rules have given to federal practice
an efficient and highly practical tt--rn. They have been met with good
faith and generous co-operation by the bench and bar. Their formation,
reception, and use is an achievement of which the bench and bar alike
may well be proud. It proves the previous underestimation of the interest
of those groups in advanced legal education, and shows that they are nmore
alive to their responsibilities and opportunities than ever before. Unlike
the days of the adoption of the David Dudley Field Code, this reform
movement has not been found to be too far advanced for the bench and bar.
Yet more remains to be done. One of the most important reasons for
the formation of a uniform federal procedure was to give an ideal pro-
eedure which, on its merits, would persuade the states to assimilate their
practice to that of the federal courts and thus to that of all other states.
The benefits of a uniform practice among state and federal courts are
obvious and it must be recognized that the present federal system is not
only superior to ours, but that it is a fit model for us to pattern after20 One
year's practice under the new federal rules reveals that the "show-mn"
state has been shown. Serious consideration of the possibility of our statv
adopting the new federal procedure is called for. Definite action should be
taken in the near future to assure such conformity.
55. Reports of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (1938) 24
A. B. A. J. 905.
56. For a detailed discussion of the superiority of the federal system and
the need for uniformity, see Gavit, The New Federal Rules and State Procedure
(1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 367. See also recent detailed study revealing that sixteen
states have a broad rule-making power, while the remainder have it in a limited
degree. Harris. The Extent and Use of Rille-Making Authority (1938) 22 JouR.
A MER. JUD. Soc. 27.
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II
The following eases have been selected from the hundreds applying
the new rules as especially illustrative of new practices, or as significant
answers to important questions arising under them. In many instances
the statement of the holding has been adapted from the head notes of the
Department of Justice Bulletins to government officials.
RULE ONE
Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 25 F.
Supp. 598 (D. Del. 1938). The provisions of Rule One that the rules
should be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of actions does not authorize the use of a bill of particulars to secure
disclosure of proof to amplify pleading.
Cities Sert'icc Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 101 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1M9).
The question as to which party has the burden of proof on an issue of
bova fide purchase for value without notice, is a matter of practice and
procedure and not a matter of substantive law. This question, therefore,
is not governed by the decisions of state courts in accordance with the rul-
ing in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
RULE Two
Therinex Co. v. Lawson, 25 F. Supp. 414 (E. D. Ill. 1938). A suit is
not subject to dismissal on the ground that it is in form a suit in equity
whereas it should have been brought as an action at law, as now there is
only one form of civil action.
Williainson r. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Del. 1939). The fact that the new rules substituted a single form of civil
action for old forms of actions at law and in equity did not abrogate the
Statute of Limitations applicable to the several forms of actions theretofore
existing. An action to recover treble damages or violation of anti-trust
laws is an action on the case and is governed by the state Statute of Limita-
tions applicable to actions on the case. See also City of El Paso v. West,
104 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
Gallaghier v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). Filing of
the complaint with the court tolls the Statute of Limitations irrespective of
the fact that the period of limitation expired before service of summons and
complaint on the defendant although the New York State Act provided that
the action was commenced by the serving of the summons. The court re-
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ferred to the question as raised in the Cleveland and Washington institutes
and MAoore's Federal Practice and (l.,-ded the question is one of procedure,
and should not be determined by the New York rule under Eric R. R. v.
Tompkins.
C. E. Partridge v. Ainley, 24 F. Supp. 43 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). In an
action by creditors to enforce the double liability of bank stockholders,
commenced prior to the effective date of the new Rules, only the doctrine
of laches, rather than the state Statute of Limitations, is applicable, since to
apply the state Statute of Limitations would impose a different and probab-
ly shorter limitation on a pending case than that existing when the action
was commenced.
McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, lnc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). In the absence of a Federal Statute of Limitations, the applicable
state statute controls.
RULE FOUR
(4b) Utility Mfg. Co. v. Elgin Laboratories, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y.,
Jan. 24, 1939. D's motion to set aside service of the summons should be
granted if it appears that since the service of the process the complaint
has been am-enief by-asserting- a new claim for relief and service of.such
amended complaint has not been made on D.
(4c) Modric v. Oregon & North Western R. R., 25 F. Supp. 79 (D. Ore.
1938). The court is permitted to designate only one person to serve a
summons. It is proper for the attorney to file a motion designating a
particular individual and setting forth his qualifications.
(3) Pioneer Utilities Corp. v. Scott-Newcornb, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 616
(E. D. N. Y. 1939). Service of summons and complaint upon a foreign
corporation by delivering a copy thereof to an officer of the corporation
is not effective unless the corporation is doing business within the state.
Cohen v. Physical Culture Shoe Co., 28 F. Supp. 679 (S. D. N. Y.
1938). Service of process on an agent of a foreign corporation who is
denominated "general manager" for purposes of business negotiations is
valid service on the corporation, even though the latter claims that the per-
son served was in fact only a "sales representative." The court found he
came within the meaning of the rule.
(7) Clancy v. Balacier, 27 F. Supp. 867 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). Action
was brought in the southern district of New York by a resident of that
state against citizens of West Virginia for personal injuries resulting from
24
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an automobile accident occurring in New York City. Copies of the sum-
mons and complaint were served on the Secretary of State of New York,
who was an agent authorized by a New York Statute to receive service of
process of non-residents operating motor vehicles within the state, and
also on the defendants by delivering copies to them personally in West
Virginia in accordance with the New York Statute and Rule 4d (7). Held,
such service fully complied with that rule.
(4f) F. & M. Skirt Co. r. Wimpfheirner & Bros., 27 F. Supp. 239 (D.
Mass. 1939). Third party process may not be served outside of the state
in which the action is pending.
Devier v. Cole Motor, 27 F. Supp. 978 (W. D. Va. 1939). In an action
for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident, service of
process on a non-resident defendant by serving the state commissioner of
motor vehicles under a state statute is valid even though the latter resided
in another judicial district of the state.
Gibbs v. The Emcrsoii Electric Mfg. Co., 29 F. Supp. 810 (W. D. Mo.
1939). The rule that process may run anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in -which the district court is held is limited by the venue
requirements. Hence, in a patent suit, in view of U. S. Code, Title 28, Sec.
109. jurisdiction over a defendant may be obtained only in the district
of which lie is an inhabitant or in which he committed acts of infringement
and has a regular, established business.
RULE FIVE
(5a) See Utility Mfg. Co. v. Elgin Laboratories ('o., I. S. Dist. Ct..
S. D. N. Y., Jan. 24, 1939.
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Perry Murphy, 28 F. Supp. 252
(W. D. Ky. 1939). If the answer in substance amounts to a cross-action
against a co-defendant, it should be served on the co-defendant.
RULE SIx
Buggelin & Smith, Izc.. t. Standard Brands, Inic., 27 F. Supp. 399
(S. D. N. Y. 1939). Efforts to file a demand for a jury trial later than ten
days after service of the last pleading may be regarded as an application
under Rule 6b for leave to enlarge such period and should be granlted if
it appears that the failure to demand a jury was excusable.
Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co.., 27 F. Supp. 803 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). l)ir-
ing the pendency of a motion to quash service of summons as to oie of' two
19401
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claims for relief, plaintiff's motion for judgment by (hfailt as to the other
claim should be denied; even though time to answer has expired.
Ains'worth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 104 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 3rd,
19:39). An order of the district court extending the ltiie to file the record
on appeal, which is entered after expiration of time sihsviibed hy rules,
is invalid if it does not set forth that it was made upon motion after notice
and that failure to file such record within the forty day period was the
result of excusable neglect.
RULE SEVEN
(7a) Fried v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 26 F. Supp.
603 (E. D. Pa. 1939). Motion by defendant for a bill of particulars will
not be granted before answer if it does not aid the expeditious disposition
of the case and if the complaint states the facts with sufficient particularity
to enable the defendant to answer. The court points out that the discovery
procedure under the new rules makes much of this motion call for duplica-
tion.
Ccntrar Fust Co. v. Secoiid A-ationa( Bank, U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Pa.,
Feb. 23. 1939. No reply is required except to a court claim or when
ordered by the court. Hence, plaintiff need not deny allegations con-
tained in the answer and the defendant's motion for judgment on pleadings
on ground of insufficient denial of allegations of the answer should be de-
iied.
k7b) Hammond-Knowlton v. Hartford Conn. Trust Co., 26 F. Supp.
292 kD. Conn. 1939). A motion to dismiss may not be made orally during
the argument on another motion, but must be made in writing. Rule 7 (b)
saying "hearing or trial" held not to mean oral argument of motion.
when the motion to dismiss is not connected or related to the motion being
argued. It must be incidental to the hearing.
(7b) Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.. 26 F. Supp. 71.)
(D. C. D. of C. 1939). If a third party defendant is brought in by an
ex parte order, the better practice for contesting the sufficiency of the third
party complaint is by a motion to vacate the order granting leave to file
it and to strike the complaint, rather than by a motion to dismiss the third
party complaint.
(7c) Equitable Life Assuranee Society v. Kit, 26 F. Supp. 880 (E. D.
Pa. 1939). A demurrer may be treated as a motion to dismiss. .Mlurphy
t. Pu get Sound Mortgage Co., or as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. ,Stueve, 25 F. Supp. 879 (D. Mini. 1938).
L[Vol. -5
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Defendant filed a demurrer to complaint against government which did not
show consent of sovereign nor that it was brought within the statutory
time. Held, demurrer treated as a motion to dismiss and is sustained.
Other cases also treat demurrer as a motion.
RULE EIGHT
Byers c. Clark & Wilson Lm fber Co., 27 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1939).
A motion to strike was allowed as to matter relating to immaterial details,
as violating Rule 8a. The immaterial facts disclosed defendant was a large
operator, and probably was meant to be read to the jury to influence them.
The court states that the new rules didn't call for a reading of the plead-
ing to the jury.
(8a) Bobrecker v. Denzebeim, 25 F. Supp. 208 (W. D. Mo. 1938).
The statement that plaintiff is the owner and proprietor of a registered label
and that it has been infringed by defendants is a proper short and plain
statement of the claim. And this "short-form" complaint was held suffi-
cient against defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of
1. Failure to show derivation of plaintiff's ownership.
2. Absence of averments as to originality and copyright ability.
3. Neglect to include in the complaint a copy of the label.
Defendant was further denied a bill of particulars to show the derivation
of.plaintiff's title, or the copyright ability of his label.
Wash burn v. M1oorna 3a Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
Complaint in action on implied contract insufficient in not stating facts to
support the conclusion of implied promise. Forms in Appendix to Rules
merely indicate simplicity and brevity of statement expected and verbatim
use does not obviate requirement that claim for relief shall contain a
statement of the claim showing pleader is entitled to relief.
Hardin r. Iterstate Motor Freight System, 26 F. 8 uplp. 97 (S. D.
Ohio 1939). In a complaint for negligence, a mere general charge of
negligence is sufficient, without specification. as indicated by Rule 8a and
Form 9 in the Appendix to the Rules.
Nester v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 25 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal.
1936). Although plaintiff in an action sounding in tort may not be able
to prove special damages pleaded by him, he may, nevertheless, recover for
breach of the contract if he is shown by the evidence to be entitled to such
1940]
27
Hunter: Hunter: One Year of Our Federal Rules
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
MISSO URI LAW REVIEW
recovery. Plaintiff should be denied relief only when the facts show hilim
entitled to none.
Gay v. E. H. Moore, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 749 (E. D. Okla. J939). I1,
under the facts alleged, the plaintiff is entitled to relief, a eoniplailit will
not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff requested reliel" to whihh JIw
was not entitled.
Sun Oil Co. v. Pfeiffer, U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Okla., April 29, 19::. A
motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount in controversY is less
than $3,000 should be denied if the complaint alleges that the amiount in-
volved, exclusive of interest and costs, isin excess of $3,000 and nolhing
else appears in the record with respect to the amount in controversy. (if.
Martin & Martin v. Moery, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. II1., March 13, 19:39, hold-
ing that the amount in controversy is more than $3,000 is an insufficient
allegation of jurisdictimal amount unless supported by other allegations
of definite and concrete faiA,: See also Kros v. Assoc. Press, 299 U. S.
269 (1936) ; 272 Fed. 456; 47 F. (2d) 826, 828.
Sierocinski r. E. I. Ditpont De Nernours & Co., 103 F. (2d) 843 (C.
C. A. 3rd. 1939). A complaint in an action on a contract, which alleges
the contract. performance by plaintiff and failure to perform on the part
of defen.danit. is good as against a motion to dismiss for insufficiency. In
an action against the manufacturer of dynamite caps to recover for per-
sonal injuries resulting from the exploding of one of the caps during the
process of crimping it. plaintiff alleged the negligent manufacture aind4 dis-
tribution of the cap in such fashion as to make it explode when crimped.
The circuit court of appeals, in reversing order dismissing complaint for
failure to set forth any specific act of negligence, held that plaintiff need
not plead evidence, that "a short and plain statement of the elaiti show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief" is sufficient as a pleading and
that further information, if needed to prepare a defense, can be 0' tained
by interrogatories. Form 9 was approved.
(8b) Xorduai v. City of Johnson City, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Ill.. Jan.
11. 1939. Averments in answer that defendant is without information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of certain allegations in the
complaint will be given the effect of a denial and should not be stricken out
even if the facts are seemingly within his knowledge.
(8e) Fraicis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. l9S). The court
held that the question as to the burden of proof as to coiitributory negli-
gence is not a matter of procedure, but of substantive lnw, and that on
the authority of the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkinhs. 104 IT. S. 64 (1938),
I Vol). 5
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the law o I l,. -,ll wiler-ilhlen flie collil. is lovated or in which the cause of
action arose iii;, le followed Oli this point. The provision of Rule 8c
that a party shull plead conlributory ieglig ,t-e as an affirmative defense
was lIehl iuot applicable to a persoial hijuiry action in a federal court
located in a state the laws of which requh'ir- tei plaintiff in such actions,
to allege ad prove freedom from contrilmtory negligence. The new rules
cannot affect substantive rights. Petition dismissed for lack of statement
of freedom from contributory negligence as required by Illinois law.
Baker v. Sisk, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Okla., Dec. 17, 1938. In view of the
fact that the Statute of Limitations is an affirmative defense to be asserted
in pleading rather than a motion, defendant's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim which raises the issue of the statute may therefore be
treated as an answer.
Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 295 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). In an
action for commissions on sales, the defense of the Statute of Frauds should
be pleaded as an affirmative defense and may not be raised by motion to
dismiss for insufficiency.
(8e) Cataiizaritti v. Bianco, 25 F. Supp. 457 (Al. D. Pa. 1938). A
pleading which contains many evidentiary allegations and inconsistent al-
legations not properly separated does not meet the requirements that plead-
ings shall be simple, concise, and direct, and should be stricken off. A
laiml in the nature of ejectment and a claim to impress a trust may be
joined alternatively in spite of the fact that they may be inconsistent.
Wheeler Corp. v. American Sutrety Co., 25 F. Supp. 645 (E. D. N. Y.
1938). The fact that a counterclaim and a third party claim interposed
by the same defendant are inconsistent with each other, is no objection to
bringing in the third party defendant.
Shzltz v. Manufacturers &C Traders Trtst Co., 29 F. Supp. 38 (W. D.
N. Y. 1939). Objections to the complaint on the ground that it does not
conform to the provisions of 8e should be presented by motion to strike
rather than by a motion to strike the entire complaint (the objectionable
provisions).
Kraits v. General Motors Corp., 27 F. Supp. 537 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
The complaint in an action on a contract for exclusive use of a patent may
joint a claim for failure to pay royalties and a claim for failure to use
plaintiff's alleged patent, even if they are inconsistent. The complaint
may contain inconsistent claims in the alternative and plaintiff should not
be required to elect upon which theory lie intends to rely.
19401
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RULE NnFE
(9a) Jewell v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 836 (W. D. Ky. 1939). In
an action against United States on War Risk Insurance Policy, plaintiff
must allege capacity to sue to the extent required to show the jurisdiction
of the court.
(9b) E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Dupont Textile Mills, Inc.,
26 F. Supp. 236 (M. D. Pa. 1939). Although fraud may not be alleged
generally, intent may be so alleged and the defendant is not entitled to
further particulars as to its own fraudulent intent.
RULE ELEVEN
United Stales v. Anmerican Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. N. Y.
1938). A complaint signed "Bingham, Englarain & Houston, by NV. J.
Nunnally" is sufficient, and there is no need to sign in the individual
capacity though his only signature is in the firm character of which he is
a member.
RULE TWELVE
(12a) Food Machinery Corp. v. Guignard, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (1). Ore.
1938). The court has no power to shorten the time for answer prescribed
by Rule 12a.
(12b) McConville v. District of Columbia, 26 F. Supp. 295 (1). a.
D. of C. 1938). A motion to dismiss which requires consideration of
matter niot appearing in the complaint is analogous to a speaking de-
murrer under the early equity practice, and should be overruled.
Pesci v. Vieser & Son, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. N. J., 1938. In a patent
suit, a motion to dismiss the complaint was considered timely, although
filed subsequently to the filing of the answer, in view of the 1'i.,t fliat
the right to make such a motion was reserved in the answer. ''lie .,,ktrt
did not refer to latter part of 12b, which would seem contrary, but result
may be sustained in that he could have asked for judgment on ploadings
after answer.
American--Mexican Claims Bureau v. Morganthan, 26 F. Supp. 904
(D. C. D. of C. 1939). By the joinder of a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction over the person with a motion to dismiss for want of
equity and for failure to join indispensable parties, defendant doos not
waive the jurisdictional defense.
Wheeler v. LientZ, 25 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. Mo. 1939). UmleJ 121
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does not contain an exhaustive enumeration of motions permitted under
the new rules, and the fact it does not mention motions for security for
costs does not prevent use of such motions under proper circumstances.
A motion for security of costs is not a "defense" nor an "objection"
under Rule 12h, and is, therefore, not waived if not presented by one
of the motions enumerated in Rule 12b.
Molesphini v. Bruno, 26 F. Supp. 595 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). After the
defense of insufficiency of service of process has been disposed of on
motion to quash, such defense may not again be interposed in the answer.
Failure to again interpose it in the answer does not constitute a waiver of
the objection.
Massachusetts Farmers Defense Committee v. United States, 26 F.
Supp. 941 (D. 'Mass. 1939). A motion to dismiss is the proper method of
raising the objection of lack of jurisdiction.
Ham ilton Watch Co. r. G. W. Borg Co., 27 F. Supp. 215 (E. D. Ill.
1939). In an action by a non-resident against a foreign corporation
which, in compliance with state law, had consented to suit in that state
for the purpose of securing a license to do business therein, a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant should be granted
since compliance with the state statute does not constitute consent to be
sued in a district other than that of a state in which the corporation was
organized or in a district other than that of the plaintiff, if service can
be had on defendant in that district.
Duarte Screw Corp. v. City of New York, 27 F. Supp. 894 (S. D. N.
Y. 1939). A third party may obtain dismissal for insufficiency, as against
it, of both plaintiff's compldint and defendant's third party complaint.
Interstate Commerce ,'ommission v. Daley, 26 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass.
1939). After defendant notifies clerk that he does not desire to contest
the action, plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings should not
be granted, but a default may be entered under 55b upon application
therefor by plaintiff.
Phoenix Hardware Co. r. Paragon Paint & Hardware C, ., F. S.
Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y., April 18. 1939. Plaintiff is not entitled ,, . 'vimrary
judgment or to judgment on the pleadings, if a material issut- , fact is
raised by the answer. A defense of res judicata is insufficient and does
not warrant summary judgment or judgment on pleadings if the claim is
based on facts transpiring subsequently to the prior judgment.
(12d) llawn v. American Steamship Co., 26 F. Supp. 428 (W. D.
N. Y. 1939). In an action for negligence by a seaman against a steam-
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ship company defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter and submitted affidavits directed to show that plain-
tilt was not engaged as a seaman. Held, under its discretion under Rule
12d the court should defer the hearing and determinationi of the motion
until the trial herein.
.Velty v Chte, 29 F. Supp. 2 (W. 1). N. Y. 1939). Undihr the cir-
cumstances of the case, determination ol inotion to disniiss on ground
that the cause of action was not one to enforce lien oil or (laini to real
or personal property located within the district, deferred until trial.
(12e) Tarbet v. Thorpe, 25 F. Supp. 222 (W. D. Pa. 1938). Plain-
tiff alleged defendant's automobile on U. S. Route #5 at an intersection
negligently changed direction and struck plaintiff's automobile. On nmo-
tion for bill of particulars, held, plaintiff's complaint is sufficiently spe-
cific.
Graham v. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 25 F. Supp. 224 (E.
D. N. Y. 1938). On motion for bill of particulars to find what hoisting
equipment defendant's agents were using, what acts were negligent, age
and names of next- of- kin of deceased, his age and amount of earnings,
held, motion granted even though parties are not yet at issue.
Ncwconb v. Universal Match Corp., 25 F. Supp. 169 (E. D. N. Y.
193S). Failure to obey order to furnish bill of particulars may preclude
that party from presenting evidence at the trial on the question involved.
Schmidt v,. Going, 25 F. Supp. 412 (AV. D. Mo. 1938). In an action
for personal injuries resulting from automobile collision and for com-
pensation for death of plaintiff's daughter upon whom she depended for
support, in which plaintiff alleged negligence generally, defendant's mo-
tion for more definite statement, asking in what manner the defendants
were negligent and the age of the daughter killed, was granted.
Wurlitzer Company v. Filben, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Minn., Nov. 3, 1938.
Bill of particulars requesting title, furnishing access to local models and
literature thereon, license agreements, and extension of time to answer,
granted in patent case.
Jessup &- Moore Paper Co. r. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 25
F. Supp. 598 (D. Del. 1938). In patent suit defendant moved for bill
of particulars as to patentable part in plaintiff's estimation, and strength
of certain chemical, and acts constituting and authorizing of one defend-
ant by co-defendant. Held motion denied because it would require either
a judicial construction of the claims of the patent or the production of
proof. Court suggested defendant use interrogatory method. Rule One's
L[Vol. 5
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/7
ONE YEAR OF OUR FEDERAL RULES
"just, speedy," etc., does not authorize use of bill of particulars to se-
cure disclosure of proof to amplify pleading.
Mulloney v. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 26 F. Supp. 148 (D.
Mass. 1938). In an action for conspiracy to cause the failure of a bank,
plaintiff may be directed to furnish bill of particulars naming specific
defendants or their agents who participated in the wrongful acts; speci-
fying times and places of events alleged; and naming persons to whom
defamatory statements were made, in spite of fact the last mentioned
item may incidentally involve a disclosure of witnesses. Plaintiff also in
bill should disclose if the alleged defamatory statements were oral or
in writing, and if the latter, to attach copies of the writings, since such
discovery may be had under Rule 34 providing for production of docu-
ments for inspection.
Mendola v. Carborundumi Co., 26 F. Supp. 359 (W. D. N. Y. 1938).
In an action under workmen's compensation law, plaintiff was required
to make complaint more definite and certain by setting forth pertinent
dates, from which it may be determined whether or not the claim is
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, 25 F. Supp. 57 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). In
an action against a guarantor of corporate bonds, defendant should not
be permitted by motion for more definite statement or for a bill of par-
ticulars to obtain the names of the original vendees of the bonds, the
consideration paid therefor, the name of the seller of the bonds to plaintiff
and the consideration paid, and a statement as to whether the plaintiffs
knew of the guarantee at the time of their purchase. Such information
should be sought under the discovery provisions of the rules.
Nordmanz v. City of Johlnson City, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Ill., Jan. 11,
1939. A motion to make a pleading more definite and certain by setting
forth precise dates of payment alleged therein, should be denied, if the
information is not essential to the sufficiency of the pleading. If need,,d
before the adverse party can safely plead, the information may be ob-
tained by a bill of particulars.
MeKenna v. United States Lbies, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 558 (S. ). N. Y.
1939). It rests in the discretion of the court to determine whether a bill of
particulars will be ordered and to what extent. 12c was designed lo
avoid any distinction between a motion to make a pleading more definite
and certain and a motion for a bill of particulars.
Tully v. Howard, 27 F. Supp. 6 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). A molioi for
bill of particulars may be made only within twenty days after service oi
1940]
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the pleading to which the motion is directed, and no such motion, direheted
to the complaint, is permitted after issue joined. The scope of a bill or
particulars should be limited to matters necessary to enable the moving
party to prepare his responsive pleading and parties should be required Io
employ other procedure provided by the rules to obtain additional in.
formation necessary to help them prepare for trial. If a motion for a bill
of particulars requests information to assist the moving party to prepare
for trial as well as that necessary to enable to prepare his responsive plead-
ings, the court may direct that only those particulars of the latter class
need be supplied.
Norton v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 806 (N. D. N. Y. 1939).
The "contention" of a party is made by pleadings and is not a proper sub-
ject of examination by deposition. It may, however, be obtained by a
motion for a bill of particulars.
South cr Grocery Stores v. Zoller Brewing Co., 26 F. Supp. 858 (S.
D. Iowa 1939). A motion for more definite statement and for a bill of
particulars should be overruled if the complaint sets forth a cause of ac-
tion and the informatior requested can be easily ascertained by inter.
rogatories under Rule 33, except that if the matters relate to jurisdiction.
the motionr should be- sustained.
Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 27 F. Supp. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
In an action for patent infringement, plaintiff's motion to strike a counter-
claim for declaratory judgment, which alleged non-infringement and in-
validity, should be denied, since without such counterclaim, plaintiff
could disniss his action and thus leave undetermined the issue of validity.
(12h) W1heeler v. Lientz, 25 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. Mo. 1939). A
motion for security of costs, is not a "defense" nor an "objection" under
Rule 12h and is, therefore, not waived if not presented by one of the mo-
tions enumerated in Rule 12b.
RULE THIRTEEN
Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. N.
Y. 1938). In an action brought by a subcontractor in the name of the
United States against the surety on a general contractor's bond, the gen-
eral contractor may intervene as a defendant and file a counterclaim
against the subcontractor if the general contractor is subject to recovery
over. And when a counterclaim arises out of the same transaction as
the -main action, it must be set up, and the court has jurisdiction even
I Vol. 5
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1940], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/7
ONE YEAR OF OUR FEDERAL RULES
though it would not have had jurisdiction if the counterclaim were set
forth in an independent suit.
(13c) Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper;
Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Andrew Weston Co., 25 F. Supp. 1021
(E. D. N. Y. 1939). In a patent suit it is proper to counterclaim for
a declaratory judgment to have the patent held invalid and non-infringed.
Kuenzel v. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co., U. S. Dist. Ct.,
E. D. Pa., Aug. 30, 1939. The defendant in an action for libel may coun-
terclaim for goods sold and delivered.
RULE FOURTEEN
(14a) Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138
(S. D. W. Va. 1939). In an action for negligence brought in the South-
ern District of West Virginia by a resident of that state against a citizen
of Virginia, defendant brought in a citizen of West Virginia by a third
party complaint. The third party defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction on the ground that there was no diversity of citizenship
between the original plaintiff and the third party defendant. Held, that
if there is requisite diversity of citizenship between the original plaintiff
and the defendant, the latter may bring in a third party defendant who
is a resident of the same state as the plaintiff and the motion was over-
ruled.
Crim r. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D. C.
D. of C. 1939). The complaint, in an action against an insurance com-
pany, alleged in one count that plaintiff abandoned a cause of action
growing out of a collisioi with an automobile belonging to defendant's
insured in consideration of defendant's promise to pay plaintiff's dam-
ages, and in a second count that plaintiff was induced by fraudulent rep-
resentations to abandon her cause of action against the estate of the driver
of the car who was killed in the accident. The defendant brought in
plaintiff's attorney by third party proceedings, alleging that the latter
was liable to the plaintiff because he negligently failed to sue ibe driver's
estate before such claim became barred by the Statute of ,,. tadons.
Third party defendant moved to dismiss third party complaint on the
ground that the claim set forth therein was "different" from that as-
serted in plaintiff's complaint. Held, that the third party proceeding
was properly brought since it met the test under Rule 14; that is, that
the claim against the third party defendant could have been originally
1940]
35
Hunter: Hunter: One Year of Our Federal Rules
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
asserted by plaintiff. The purpose of third party practice is to avoid two
actions which should be tried together. Third party practice permits
the defendant to bring in a third party defendant who is liable to either
the plaintiff or the defendant. If the claim set out in tile third party
complaint might have been asserted against the third party defendant
had lie been joined originally as a defendant, he may be brought in as a
third party defendant. Plaintiff may state two alternative causes of
action, one against the defendant and the other against the third party
defendant, a judgment for plaintiff against otne (annot be collected from
the other. Parties may be joined as defendants against whom the right
to relief exists in the alternative. Dictum: "If the plaintiff declines to
amend the complaint and assert a claim for relief against the third party
defendant, the court is inclined to believe that judgment cannot be
awarded against the third party defendant in favor of the plaintiff."
(14a-b) Tuligren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md. 1939). In a
personal injury action brought jointly against the owner of the taxicab
in which plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the accident and the
owner of -the truck- in which the taxicab collided, the owner of the truck
may not bring in the insurer of his co-defendant as a third party defend-
ant. The defendant in a personal injury action may bring in his own
liability insurer as a third party defendant. By way of dictumi, the court
observed that third party procedure is probably ancillary to the main ac-
tion and if jurisdiction of the court on the ground of diversity of eiti-
zenship has properly attached-to the action between the original parties,
diversity of citizenship between the third party plaintiff and the third
party defendant is not necessary.
RULE FIFTEEN
(15a) Rhode v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (W.-D. Mo. 1939). Al-
though the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction in
a labor dispute, if it appears from the complaint that the Norris-La-
Guardia Act bars such a remedy, nevertheless a motion to dismiss should
be denied if it also appears that plaintiff can amend his pleading so as
to show the necessary jurisdiction.
Moore v. Illinois Central R. R., 24 F. Supp. 731 (S. D. Miss. 1938).
In a contract action removed from a state into a federal court, plaintiff's
motion for judgment declining defendant permission to plead further
on the grounds that such further pleading was prohibited by state stat-
ute, was denied, the court holding the federal rules were controlling and
(Vol. 5
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that leave to amend pleadings should be freely given when justice so
requires.
(15c) Garvy v. Allborg, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Ill., Aug. 24, 1939.
If an amended complaint merely remedies a defective pleading without
setting forth a new claim, the Statute of Limitations is not applicable,
even if the statutory period expired between the institution of the action
and the service of the amended pleading; but if additional defendants are
joined after the expiration of the period fixed by the Statute of Limita-
tions, the claim is barred as to them, even though the action was timely
brought as against the original defendants.
Colimbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Ore.,
Aug. 9, 1939. A plaintiff in an action for equitable relief should not be
permitted to amend his complaint at the trial by including a claim of a
legal nature, as he would thereby deprive the defendant of the right to
demand trial by jury.
RULE SIXTEEN
Penn v. Automobile Insurance Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore. 1939).
In view of the provisions for pre-trial procedure, the court may, in ad-
vance of a second trial of an action, make rulings as to the use of testimony
given by a witness at the first trial.
W1isdom v. Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 992 (N. D. Ala. 1939). Plaintiff's
failure to appear at a pre-trial conference ordered by the court, advance
notice of which was given to the attorneys for both parties, constitutes
a failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the rules, and defend-
ant's motion to dismiss t]', action on the merits should be granted.
Fink v. UTnited Stat's, 28 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. Wash. 1939). At a
pre-trial conference, the court may take evidence on the question of juris-
diction, and if it is found that jurisdiction is lacking, the action may
be dismissed with prejudice.
RULE SEVE-NTEE;.
Lloyd Moore, Inc. v. Schwartz, 26 F. Supp. 188 (E. D. I'a. 1938).
In an action in which there is a nominal plaintiff and a "use" plaintiff,
the residence of the former is determinative of the question whether the
requisite diversity of citizenship exists for jurisdictional purposes. The
requirement that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest does not necessarily preclude the bringing of an a.tion
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by one party "to the use of" another, in cases in which actions were
heretofore brought in that manner.
(17a) National Association of Industrial Ins. Agents v. C. I. 0., U.
S. Dist. Ct., District of Columbia, Nov. 18, 1938. An unincorporated
labor organization is subject to suit in its common name. The court
cited 93 F. (2d) 56, as authority.
Southern Ohio Say. B. & T. Co. v. Guaranty Truest Co. of N. Y., 27 F.
Supp. 485 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). A guardian appointed in one state may
not bring suit in a federal court in another state, if by the laws of the
latter state such guardian does not have capacity to sue.
RULE EIGHTEEN
(18a) Federal Houlsig Administrator v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp.
419 (D. Conn. 1939). A claim on a promissory note against three defend-
ants may not be joined with a claim on another promissory note against
two defendants, as they do not present a common question of law or fact.
When causes are improperly joined, the remedy is not by motion to
dismiss, but by permitting the claims to be severed and proceeded with
separately.
M.ichelso2L u Shell Union Oil Corp., 26 F. Supp. 594 (D. Mass. 1939).
Although the rules do not apply to proceedings in copyright, it is within
the spirit of the rules to permit the joinder of two counts in tort under
the copyright statute with a count in contract even though under the
Conformity Act such joinder would not have been permitted.
Columbia Rirer Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Ore.,
Aug. 9, 1939. A claim for money damages may be joined with a claim
for injunctive relief in an action under the anti-trust laws.
RULE NINETEEN
(19b) Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. v. Schrack, 27 F. Supp. 35 (I. D.
Pa. 1939). A Delaware corporation brought action against twenty-
six former officers and directors to recover damages for various acts of
fraud, negligence, and misconduct, jurisdiction being based solely on di-
versity of citizenship. Twenty-four of the defendants were residents of
the district in which suit was brought, some of whom moved to dismiss
for improper venue on ground that some of the other defendants were
non-residents. Held, since liability of the defendants was joint and sev-
eral, the non-resident defendants were not indispensable parties and
therefore the motion should be denied. If several of a number of joint
(Vol. 5
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tort-feasors are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the action may
proceed without joining other tort-feasors, as they are not indispensable
parties. Separate trials may be had.
RULE TWENTY
McNally v. Simozs, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., July 19, 1939.
Joinder of parties defendant is permissible if such joinder results in no
substantial prejudice to a defendant, and if delay, expense and incon-
venience to witnesses will be lessened by such joinder.
(20a) Whatley v. Missoutri Pacific R. R., 27 F. Supp. 919 (W. D.
La. 1939); Crim v. LumbermeW's Mututal Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715
(D. C. D. of 0. 1939). In an action to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained while unloading a freight car, plaintiff may join as parties
defendant the resident delivering carrier and the non-resident initial car-
rier, if both of them were responsible for the accident. Hence, a motion
to remand to the state court after the latter had removed the case on
the grounds of a separable controversy as to it, should be denied. Par-
ties may be joined as defendants against whom the right to relief exists
in the alternative.
(20a) Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Pe-
troleum Corp., U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Ala., Aug. 1, 1939. Parties defendant
may be joined only if the rights to relief against them arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions, and if there is a common ques-
tion of law or fact. Both conditions must exist.
RULE TWENTY-ONE
Federal Housing Administrator v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419
(D. Conn. 1939). When causes of action are improperly joined, the
remedy is not by motion to dismiss but by permitting the claims to be
severed and proceeded with separately.
Berke v. United Paperboard Co.. 26 F. Supp. 412 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
A motion to dismiss as to one of the plaintiffs on the ground that lie is not
a proper party will be denied if it raises an issue of fact.
Holmberg v. Hannaford, 28 F. Supp. 216 (S. D. Ohio 1939). Neith,'r
the misjoinder of parties plaintiff nor misjoinder of parties defendant
is a ground for dismissal.
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RuLE TWENTY-TWO
Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York v. Baker, 26 F. Supp.
956 (W. D. Mlo. 1939). A complaint in interpleader caimot be maii-
tained by the surety on a bond given to protect those dealing with the
principal against loss on account of wrongful acts, for the purpose of
determining the respective rights of the surety and multiple claimants
under the bond, since the multiple liability is not ol the same obligation.
The court thought that Rule 22 has no application where there is no
double exposure on the same obligation.
RULE TWENTY-THREE
(23b) Rinu v. Asbestos Mfg. Co., 101 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939). Plaintiffs in a representative stockholders suit against the com-
pany and its directors for an accounting for mismanagement and con-
spiracy to defraud the company and its stockholders must allege and
prove that plaintiffs were shareholders at the time of the transactions
of which complaint is made- or. that their holdings have since come to them
by operation of law.
(23c) Sauer v. Newhouse, 26 F. Supp. 326 (D. N. J. 1939). In a
representative stockholders suit against officers of the corporation the mail-
ing to all stockholders, pursuant to the order of the court, of a copy of a
rule to show cause why the suit should not be dismissed with prejudice,
constitutes the notice of the proposed dismissal required by Rule 23c.
Alice P. Ilutcehnson v. The Fidelity Investment Ass'n, 106 F. (2d)
431 (C. C. A. 4th. 1939). The requirement that in a class action, notice of
a proposed voluntary dismissal or compromise should be given to all mem-
bers of the-class, is limited to an attempted dismissal by the plaintiff, and
such a notice is not a condition precedent to dismissal by the court after
hearing on the merits.
RULE TWENTY-FOUR
United States v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116
(D. Del. 1939). In an action by the United States under the anti-trust
laws to compel defendant to divest itself of stock of another corpora-
tion another shareholder of the latter corporation will not be so adversely
affected by the disposition of defendant's shares as to entitle it to infler-
vene of right; nor to have such an interest as to entitle to intervene of
right. In order to entitle a person to intervene of right, his interest in
[Vol. 5
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the property in the custody of the court should be a legal interest. In-
tervention of right may not be allowed if the applicant would not be
bound by a judgment in the main action.
United States v. Lane Life Boat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E. D. N. Y.
1938). In an action by the United States to recover on a bond to hold the
government harmless of liability for the use of any patent embodied in
certain life boats purchased by the government, the president of the vendor
company who had agreed to indemnify the defendant surety company is
a proper person to intervene. The court found counsel for present de-
fendant was not friendly to interests of intervenor, and allowed inter-
vention though intervenor could not have been forced in as defendant, and
though only indirectly would the judgment against the existing parties
have affected him.
(24b) Sloan v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 108 (S.
D. AW. Va. 1939). An injured employee receiving compensation under an
Employees' Compensation Act brought suit for negligence against third
party. The applicable state law accorded a right of subrogation to the
compensation insurance carrier. Held, insurance carrier should be per-
nitted to intervene as party plaintiff in the action for negligence.
United States v. Colrnibia Gas & Electric Corp., 28 F. Supp. 168 (D.
Del. 1939). Intervention will not be permitted when the issues sought to be
raised are outside the scope of the main action, for such intervention would
delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties.
RULE TWENTY-SIX
Saiiolis v. National Bi,'zk of Greece & Hellenic Bank Triust Co., 25 F.
Supp. 966 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). Notice to take depositions given by plaintiff
after answer has been filed should not be set aside on assertion that defend-
ant intends to file an amended answer.
White v. Reach, 26 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). Rule 26 regard-
ing examination before trial held applicable in copyright cases on the
ground that Rule One of the copyright rules provides that e.:Jistin_- rules
of equity practice, which are now contained in the federal r.,tc: of civil
procedure, shall be enforced so far as they may be applicable in copyright
suits.
Bennett v. The Westover, Inc.,. 27 F. Supp. 10 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). A
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Whitaker v. MacFadden Pitblications, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Jan.
9, 1939. If the deposition of a party to the action is to be taken orally, it
is not necessary to serve a subpoena or to pay fees and mileage. Indica-
tion is for same rule on written examination.
(26b) Norton v. Jarrett-Wilson, IT. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. N. Y., Dee.
28, 1938. A party is not entitled to examination before trial on matters
within his own knowledge nor on matters admitted in adversary's pleadings.
Benevanto v. A. & P. Food Stores, 26 F. Supp. 424 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
On an examination before trial defendant should be required to give any
testimony which would be admissible upon the trial of the action, not-
withstanding the fact that the information sought is within the knowl-
edge of the plaintiff, the test being: "whether or not the testimony would
be admissible upon the trial of the action."
Nickols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908 (D. Mass. 1938). Discovery
can be obtained on facts or matters that are within the knowledge of both
parties. And the distinction between evidentiary facts and ultimate or
material facts is abolished. (Note that in view of the broad language of
Rule 26b and because one of the purposes of an examination before trial
is to secure evidence in support of the examining party's case, and another
is t& ascertain the elaims and- assertionsof the adverse party, this holding
allowing examination of facts within the knowledge of the examining
party seems sound. See the address of Professor Sunderland, reported
in Proceedings of the Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules (Am. Bar.
Ass'n, 1938)).
McCarthy v. Palmer, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y., Oct. 16, 1930. A
party should not be permitted to examine affidavits and similar material
secured by another party by independent investigation incident to the
preparation of the latter's case for trial, except in the most unusual cir-
cumstances.
KMlich v. Murray, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., June 13, 1939. In an
action for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an auto-
mobile accident, plaintiff may take the depositions of representatives of
defendants insurance company concerning investigations made and state-
ments obtained by them. Information obtained by defendant's insurer in
an automobile collision case is not privileged.
Nachod & United States Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 26 F.
Supp. 418 (D. Conn. 1939). In an action to obtain the issue of letters pat-
ent. the plaintiff may, by use of depositions, examine the person previously
held to have been the prior inventor, to ascertain whether he has granted
( Vol. 5
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an exclusive license, since an exclusive licensee is an indispensable party to
such an action. After ascertaining the facts in this manner, the licensee
may be brought in as an additional party defendant, if the court has juris-
diction over him.
RULE TWENTY-SEVE'N
Egan v. Morgan Towing & Transportation ('o., 26 F. Supp. 621 (S.
D. N. Y. 1939). Petitioner in a proceeding to perpetuate testimony in
anticipation of an action for damages for wrongful death which occurred
on board a tug, may not be permitted to inspect and survey the tug. Dis-
covery by deposition before action under Rule 27 should be limited to the
taking of testimony of persons.
IRULE TWENTY-NINE
Laverett t. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 790 (E. D. N.
Y. 1939). Defendant's attorneys stipulated that plaintiff's attorney's
stenographer might take the depositions. Defendant now wants supres-
sion of such testimony. Held, defendant by so stipulating must be taken
to have waived the objection. However, the court will relieve defendant's
attorney of further taking of depositions under his stipulation if it has
misgivings as to the fidelity of the stenographer. That testimony already
taken will be admitted.
RUm.E THIRTY
Bnnctt v. The Westover. Inc., 27 F. Supp. 10 (S. D. X. Y. 1938). In
a damage suit, held notice to take deposition need not state the matters
upon which the examination is sought. The only requirement is that the
exanination be limited to any matter that is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action and that such matter is not privileged.
Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939). A notice of examination before trial must state the name
and address of each person to be examined, if knowNn, and if i. t known,
a general description sufficient to identify him or the pariicuh class or
group to which he belongs, and it is not sufficient if the notice n..-1Q states
that it is to examine a corporate party "by the officers, directors, man-
aging agents or employees having knowledge thereof." Such notice need
not particularize the matter on which the examination is sought.
Bough v. Lee, 26 F. Supp. 1000 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). When both parlics
serve notice to take depositions, the one who first serves his notice shotuld
1 940]
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ordinarily be permitted to complete his examinations before the other be-
gins.
Barrezueta v. Sword Steamship Line, 27 F. Supp. 935 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). A party proceeding to take depositions may not move to limit
the scope of the examination.
RULE Tin RTY-ONL
(31a) Rowe v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., Dis-
trict of Columbia, Jan. 25, 1939. Defendant's attorney may refuse to
answdr questions as to the identity and location of witnesses if the only
information he has was obtained from the defendant and hence is con-
fidential and privileged.
(31d) Fall Corp. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 765 (E. D. Texas
1938). Court's discretion to require that a deposition be taken on oral
examination should be exercised when direct interrogatories are so numer-
ous and involved as to make it practically impossible to frame cross-
interrogatories.
RULE THIRTY-THREE
American La France-Foamite Corp. v. American Oil Co., 25 F. Supp.
386 (D. Mass. 1938). Interrogatories to parties under Rule 33 may Be
used to elicit information broader in scope than that which may be elieted
by a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 12e.
Penn v. Automobile Insurance Co., 27 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore. 1939).
Interrogatories requesting the names and address of persons having in-
formation or knowledge supporting the cause of the adverse party, are
proper.
Caggiano v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 27 F. Supp. 240 (D. MAass. 1939).
Interrogatories requiring a party to state his contentions or legal eonclu-
sions are improper.
Dixon v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 27 F. Supp. 797 (W. D. La. 1939). In-
terrogatories to parties are not limited to a development of ultimate facts
but may extend to merely evidentiary details.
Stanley Works & Giteneau v. Mersick & Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Conn.,
Feb. 15, 1939. Interrogatories should be limited to matters of fact as
distinguished from matters of opinion.
0'Rozurke v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictutres, 27 F. Stpp. 996 (D. Mlass.
1939). In a non-jury action interrogatories addressed to the amount of
damages are premature prior to the determination of liability.
(Vol. 5
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Ferry-IHallock Co. v. Frost, 29 F. Supp. 43 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). Mo-
tion for bill of particulars is not proper as to matters which are proper
subjects for interrogatories.
RULE THIRTY-FOUR
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 102 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
An order of the district court under Rule 34 for the discovery and pro-
duction of documents for inspection, etc., is an interlocutory order and
therefore not appealable.
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 26 F. Supp. 711
(S. D. N. Y. 1939). Documents produced by defendant in response to
subpoena duces tecum may not be inspected by plaintiff under Rule 34
in advance of an inspection and determination by the court that they con-
tain evidence material to the issues. The question of materiality is not
to be determined by mere examination of the subpoena.
Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 295 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
Discovery of documents should not be permitted until answer is filed since
until issue is joined it cannot be determined whether or not the requested
documents contain evidence material to any issue.
Mulloney v. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 26 F. Supp. 148 (D.
Mass. 1938). Plaintiff in an action for conspiracy should be required,
on defendant's motion for further particulars, to specify whether al-
leged defamatory statements were oral or in writing and, if the latter,
to attach copies of the writings, since such discovery may be had under
Rule 34.
Orange County Theatres v. Levy, 26 F. Supp. 416 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
A party may be compelled to produce only such papers, etc., as are in his
possession or under his control.
Beler v. Savarona Ship Corp., 26 F. Supp. 599 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
A party seeking a discovery of documents need not prove their materiality,
but need only establish that it is reasonably probable that the docuinents
constitute or contain material evidence. Stipulation by the parties, re-
quiring the production, etc., of certain documents constitute' w iver of
requirement of showing reasonable probability of materiality.
Teller v. Montgomery Ward, 27 F. Supp. 938 (E. D. Pa. 1939). Pro-
duction of records of articles for inspection should, technically, be sought
under Rule 34, but if such discovery has been attempted by motion for
a bill of parlieulars no useful purpose would be served by dcn.ying it.
,Nlydell v. Capital Transit Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., D. C., 0.f. 6. 1939.
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Production of documents which are not admissible in evidence, except pos-
sibly as a means of contradicting a witness at the trial, should be denied.
A motion of the production of documents is too late if made at the pre-
trial hearing. Interrogatories to parties are too late if served at the pre-
trial hearing, except as to some newly developed situation.
RULE TIRTY-FIVE
(a) Wadlow r. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W. 1). Mo. 1939). A mo-
tion for an order to require plaintiff to submit to a physical and mental
examination should be overruled, in an action for libel stating that plain-
tiff was suffering from various physical and mental conditions. Court held
that mental or physical condition was not immediately or directly in con.
troversy, and thus not in the meaning of 35a. Court seems to restrict the
application of 35a to damage suits.
Gitto v. The Italia, Societa Anomina Di Navigazione, Genova, 27 F.
Supp. 785 (E. D. X. Y. 1939). Selection of the physician to conduct
physical examination rests in sound discretion of the court.
RULE THIRTY-SIX
Walsh v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.,. 26 F. Supp. 566 (E. D.
N. Y. 199). A party served with a request for admissions of fact is
deemed to have admitted all relevant facts if he does not within the time
allowed by the rules specifically deny them or set forth reasons why lie can-
not truthfully admit or deny them. The word "therein" in the first sen-
tence of Rule 36a refers to matters of fact relevant to the pleadings and
contained in the request for admissions and does not refer merely to mat-
ters of fact set forth in documents concerning which an admission of gen-
uineness is requested.
Treasire Imports v. Adur & Sons, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Jan.
23, 1939. A party need not comply with a request under Rule 36 which
seeks to obtain an admission as to evidence which it is claimed certain per-
sons would give if called as witnesses.
Booth Fisheries Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 27 F. Supp. 268 (D.
Del. 1939). A party should not be required to admit or deny facts which
are not within his knowledge but which are probable by testimony of third
parties.
RULE THIRTY-SEVEN
Freeman v. Hotcl Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939). The remedy provided in 37d for wilful failure to appear after
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being served with notice to take depositions, applies only to parties or
officers or managing agents of parties and not to other persons.
RULE THIRTY-EIGHT
Buggelin & Smith v. Standard Brands, 27 F. Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). The time within which a party may demand a trial by jury as of
right terminates at the expiration of ten days after the service of the
last original pleading and the subsequent service of amended pleadings does
not extend such period.
Pacific Indemnity Company v. McDonald, 25 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ore.
1938), aff'd U. S. C. C. A. 9th, Nov. 6, 1939. Questions that would be
triable by a jury in an action for money damages are also triable by jury
in an action for a declaratory judgment.
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Ore.,
Aug. 9, 1939. A plaintiff should not in an action for equitable relief be
permitted to amend his complaint at the trial to include a legal claim as
he would thereby deprive the defendant of the right to demand trial by
jury on that claim.
RULE FORTY-oNE
Culmerville Coal Co. v. Downing, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Ohio, Nov. 25,
1938. Attorney under a contingent fee agreement does not have sufficient
interest to support a motion to intervene in opposition to a proposed stipu-
lation of dismissal executed by all the parties.
Stanley Works & Geneau v. Mersick & Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Ore.,
Feb. 15, 1939. In view of 41a, which prohibits voluntary dismissals after
answer is filed, a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief on the issues
involved in the main action is redundant and should be stricken.
Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 27 F. Supp. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
In an action for patent infringement, plaintiff's motion to strike a counter-
claim for declaratory judgment, which alleged non-infringement and in-
validity, should be denied since, without such counterclaim, plaintiff could
dismiss his action and thus leave undetermined the issue of validity.
Cincinnati Traction Bldg. Co. v. Pullman-Standard Car Manufac-
turing Co., 25 F. Supp. 322 (D. Del. 1938). After defendant in a patent
suit filed answer and prepared for trial at great expense, plaintiff's mo-
tion to dismiss without prejudice should be denied. Such refusal is within
the discretion of the court.
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Clevdand Trust Co. v. Osher &" Reiss, Inc., U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y.,
April 17, 1939. Filing notice of second voluntary dismissal of a elaim
operates as an adjudication upon the merits although the previous dis-
missal was secured before the effective date of rules, provided second is
after such date.
Russo-Asiatic Bank v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 27 F. Siipp. 382
(S. D. X. Y. 1939). Defendant filed an answer to intervenor's .ross-
claim and then a motion for leave to serve ain amended answer selting tiI)
a counterclaim against the intervenor. By consent, hearing on the !ot ion
was delayed although parties stipulated it should be deemed made and
heard as of date filed, and in meantime intervenor moved to withdraw from
the ease. Held, since the counterclaim had, for all practical purposes, been
pleaded before intervenor's motion for voluntary dismissal, the latter mo-
.tion should be denied.
Martin. etc. v. Southern Ry., U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Tenn., April 4, 1939.
Plaintiff may be required to reimburse defendant for -costs paid by latter
in previous action which was voluntarily nonsuited, and pending action
may be dismissed if such payment is not made.
Botkins v. Sorter, U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. La., Sept. 15, 1939. Failure
to serve a bill of particiars as directed is ground for dismissal of the ac-
fion on motiofi of adverse parfy.
RuLE FORTY-TWO
Kager v. Inland Power & Light Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Wash,,
April 7, 1939. When numerous parties bring separate actions for negli-
gence against the same defendant to recover damages for increased flow
of water, the defense being that the damages were caused by an act of
God. such actions should not be consolidated for the trial of issues as to
whether the negligence was the proximate cause of each party's bijury
or as to the amount of damages. The court reserved for future determi-
nation the question of whether such actions should be consolidated for
the trial of the issues bearing on defendant's negligence.
Karolkicwicz v. City of Schenectady, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. N. Y.,
Mareh 3,. 1939. In an action for personal injuries in which defendant
alleged failure to file notice of claim within statutory time but conceded
that the running of the statute would be tolled during the incapacity of
the plaintiff and for a reasonable time thereafter, a motion for a separate
trial of the issue of incapacity was granted, as a matter of discretion, on
condition that the defendant pay plaintiff's expenses in connection with
I Vol. 5
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such trial, in order to protect plaintiff if he had to twice present his evi-
dence.
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). When a legal counterclaim is set up in an equity action, the equi-
table issue should be disposed of first, after which the trial of the legal
issue may proceed.
Wyatt D. Shultz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 29 F. Supp.
37 (W. D. N. Y. 1939). Actions between the same parties, and based upon
the same allegations of fraud and conspiracy may be consolidated even
before joinder of issue, if it appears that they involve a common question
of law or fact.
Cecil, etc. v. Missouri Public Corporation, 28 F. Supp. 649 (W. D.
Mo. 1939). Four actions for personal injuries against the same defendant,
in which the injuries are alleged to have been caused at the same time
by the same negligence, all issues being identical except the extent of each
plaintiff's injuries, should be consolidated notwithstanding objection by
plaintiffs. Consolidation of cases for trial does not deprive parties of
their constitutional right of trial by jury.
RULE FORTY-THREE
United States i. Aluminum Company of America, 26 F. Supp. 711
(S. D. N. Y. 1939). Rule 43 determines admissibility of evidence and is
intended to liberalize it. If under the state rule, evidence is inadmissible
and there is no federal rule on the subject, the question is an open one for
the court's determination. In the instant case the federal rule was against
admissibility and there was no state rule, and the court rejected the evi-
dence.
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). Examinations before trial should conform to rules of evidence.
John J. McCarthy v. Howard S. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (B. D. N.
Y. 1939). Documents produced for inspection become admissible on behalf
of the producing party even if the demanding party refuses to place them
in evidence, although the state rule may be to the contrary.
RULE FORTY-FIVE
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 26 F. Supp. 711 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939). A subpoena duces teczum under 45b may be invoked only fov
production of documents for use as evidence and not documents to be
1940J
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used to refresh a witness' recollection. In respect of the character of
documents, the production of which may be required, Rules 34 and 45b
must be interpreted as in pari materia.
Whitaker v. MacFadden, Publications, U. S. )ist. Ct., S. D. N. Y.,
Jan. 9, 1939. Documents produced in response to a subpoena should be
examined first by the court before submission to opposing counsel, and a
hearing granted on materiality. If the deposition of a party to the ac-
tion is to be taken orally, it is not necessary to serve a subpoena or to pay
fees or mileage.
Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y.
1938). A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken
who resides and transacts his business in person in one county cannot be
required to attend an examination in another county.
Lester R. Bachner v. Eickhoff & Co., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 105 (S. D. N.
Y. 1939). The court, after reserving decision on plaintiff's motion for
directed verdict, has the power, on plaintiff's motion, to set aside verdict
for the defendant and to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
RULE FIFTY-TWO
United S&-ates- . Bethlehem Steel Corp., 26 F. Supp. 259 (R_-1D. Pa.
1938). The court need not make findings of fact and conclusions of law
in passing on the report of a referee, which contains findings.
Penmac Corp. v. Esterbrook Steel Pen, Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 86 (S.
D. N. Y. 1939). Findings of fact and conclusions of law in injury cases
should not be a part of the opinion of the court but should be separately
stated dnd numbered. Findings should contain only essential facts and
should not include evidence. Counterfindings need not be submitted by
defeated party.
17nited States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Mary Pauch Sears, 29 1'. Supp.
643 (D. Conn. 1939). Formal findings of facts are not required if all state-
ments of fact made on behalf of either party are admitted in the plead-
ings.
RULE FIFTY-FOUR
Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa., March 6, 1939.
A judgment in a civil action which would have been a suit in equity under
the old procedure must comply with Equity Rule 71. It appears the judge
took the position that the old equity rules have not been superseded by
the new rules and both are in effect. This is opposed to the view of the
(Vol. 5
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Advisory Committee and of Professor Moore. See Moore's Federal Prac-
tice (1938) 36.
Gay v. E. H. Moore, 26 F. Supp. 749 (E. D. Okla. 1939). If under the
facts alleged plaintiff is entitled to relief, a complaint will not be dismissed
merely because the plaintiff has requested relief to which he was not en-
titled.
Borton v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 579 (D. Neb. 1938).
Amendment to complaint in order to pray for alternative relief is not in-
dispensable in view of Rule 54c which provides for granting the relief
to which a party is entitled even if he has not demanded it.
RULE FIFTY-FIVE
New Jersey Federation of Young Men's and Yowng Women's Hebrew
Associations v. Richard J. Hoffman, 26 F. Supp. 556 (MN. D. Pa. 1939).
Default judgment should not be entered against a party who has ap-
peared in the action unless he has been served with notice or the application
for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing.
RULE FIFTY-SIX
Walsh v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y.
1939). Summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand ad-
mitted by reason of a party's failure to deny statements contained in a
request for admissions show that no material issue of fact exists.
Whiteman v. Federal Life Ins. Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Mo., Feb.
16, 1939. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only in a
very clear case and only if under the conceded facts, or facts indubitably
established by the pleadings and affidavits, the case could not be submitted
to the jury if it went to trial.
Boernier v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). On a
motion for a summary judgment the court should disregard all statements
based upon hearsay in the supporting and opposing affidavits.
Saunders v. Higgins, 29 F. Supp. 326 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). M[otion
for summary judgment should be denied if the court upon the entire rec-
ord is able to find a trial would not be a useless form. Supporting affidav-
its should contain only statements which should be admissible in evidence.
RULE FIFTY-SEVEN
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 25 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ore. 1938).
Action to recover damages caused by auto collision was brought in state
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.ourt. Insurance company which insured that defendant against liability,
brought suit in federal court for a declaratory judgment adjudicating that
it was not liable because of breach of policy by insured. Held, the pen-
deney of action in state court did not bar the action for de(laratory
judgment. And questions that would be triable by jury in a, an.tion for
money damages are also triable by jury in an action for a declaratory
judgment.
Ohio Casutalty Co. v. Richards, 27 F. Supp. 18 (D. Ore. 1939). An
insurance company which was defending a negligence suit brought in
state court against a person for whom it carried liability insurance filed
action in federal court for declaratory judgment adjudicating its non-
liability on policy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on
ground of pendency of prior action. The court, after expressin, sonic
doubt. tentatively denied motion to dismiss.
RULE FIFTY-NINE
Clicseski v. ,Strawbridge & Clothier, 25 F. Supp. 325 (D. N. J. 1938).
A new trial may be granted as-to the element of damage only.
United States v. Colangelo, 27 F. Supp. 921 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). Be-
tore entry of judgment in an action tried without a jury, the court may,
v'n motion for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence, allow the
opening of the case for the reception of such evidence.
RULE SIXTY-ONE
Ccrrin v. Grant Co., 100 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939). In an
aw.tion for wrongful death, the erroneous refusal of the trial court to
admit the deposition of the deceased is not a harmless error and judgment
was reversed on appeal.
RULE SIXTY-FIVE
Thermex Co. v. Lawson, 25 F. Supp. 414 (E. D. 111. 1938). Should
The court be asked to grant interlocutory relief in form of injunction, the
plaintiff cannot rely on its unverified complaint but must adduce sworn
proof. No indemnity bond need be given until the preliminary injunction
is ready to be granted.
RULE SIXTY-SIX
Donald Bicknell r. Lloyd-,Simith, 25 F. Supp. 657 (E. D. N. Y. l.3q).
A receiver appointed by a state authority in a state other than that in
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which the federal court is held, may not sue in a federal court, but an
ancillary receiver must be appointed for that purpose. This principle
has not been modified by the new rules.
RULE SEVENTY-THREE
Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 104 J4'. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1939). MeCrone v. United ,States, 59 Sup. Ct. (1939) 685. After notice
of appeal has been timely filed, the circuit court of appeals may permit the
record on appeal to be filed at any time. An order of the district court
extending the time to file the record on appeal, which is entered after the
expiration of the time prescribed by the rules, is invalid if it does not
set forth that it was made upon motion after notice and that failure to
file such record within the forty-day period was the result of excusable
neglect.
Rule 81a which makes the rules applicable to appeals in habeas corpus
proceedings does not extend to such proceedings the provisions of Rule 73d
relating to supersedeas bonds.
Crump v. Hill, 104 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939). The timely filing
of a waiver of service of notice of appeal and entry of an appearance to
an appeal, together with a designation of the record on appeal by both
parties, is sufficient to give the appellate court jurisdiction of the appeal,
although no notice of appeal was actually filed in time, and though the
party admits that the filing is jurisdictional. The method used is the
equivalent.
RULE SEVENTY-FOUR
Schaffer v. Pennsylvania Ry., 101 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
Tighe v. Maryland Casualty Co., 99 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
In an action against two joint tort-feasors, a verdict was directed in favor
of one defendant, and a verdict was rendered by the jury against the other
defendant. The plaintiff appealed, assigning as error the direction of the
verdict in favor of the first defendant. Held, the rendition of judgment
against the second defendant does not bar the right to prosecute appeal
as against the first, especially as Rule 74 abolishes summons and severance.
RULE SEVENTY-FIVE
Speer v. Rural Special School District No. 50, 100 F. (2d) 202 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1938). Cloud v. McLean-Arkansas Lumber Co., U. S. Dist. Ct.,
1940J
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E. 1). Ark., Aug. 3, 1939. Whether a party on appeal has requested the
incorporation in the record of matter which is not essential to the ap-
peal should be decided by the appellate court, which can discourage such
conduct by withholding or imposing costs.
RULE EIGHTY-ONE
United States v. Certain Land, 25 F. Supp. 52 (W. 1). IKy. 1938).
Tile rules do not apply to condemnation proceedings, except on appeal.
Angel v. MoLellan Stores, 27 F. Supp. 893 (E. D. Tenn. 1939). In
an action removed from a state to a federal court, a demand for trial
by jury made in the state court before removal is sufficient reservation to
entitle the party to trial by jury in the federal court.
On June 5, 1939, the United States Supreme Court amended Copy-
right Rule I to include the new federal rules, effective Sept. 1, 1939.
RULE EIGHTY-TWO
Kbig. v..Slie.pherd, 26 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ark. 1938). In an action
brought by resident of Western District of Arkansas against a MAissouri
citizen to recover damages caused by auto accident, defendant brought in
his insurer, a citizen of kldahoma, by a thii'd party complaint. Third party
defendant moved to dismiss third party complaint for improper venue.
Ield. that the third party complaint presented a severable controve'sy.
and. therefore, in the light of Rule 82, prohibiting construction of the rules
so as to extend the venue of actions, the Western District of Arkansas was
not the proper venue for the third party proceedings, and the motion was
granted.
Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W. D. Pa. 1939). A third
party claim is merely ancillary to the original action and the fact that
the third party defendant and the plaintiff are citizens of the same state
and residents also (of same district) does not deprive the court of juris.
diction or create improper venue.
F. & M. Skirt Co. v. Wimpfheinzer & Bro., 27 F. Supp. 239 (D. Mass.
1939). Third party process may not be served outside of the state in which
the action is pending.
RULE EIGHTY-THREE
Wheeler v. Lientz. 25 F. Supp. 939 (W. D. Mo. 1939). Rule 83 coil-
stitutes authority for the continuation in effect of rules previously estab-
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lished by the district courts and which are not inconsistent with the Fed-
eral Rules.
Wells v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 29 F. Supp. 144 (W. D.
Ky. 1939). On matters not covered by the new rules the courts may
continue to follow local state practice under which the closing argument
to the jury is made by plaintiff's attorney.
RULE EIGHTY-FOUR
Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
The forms contained in the appendix to the Rules merely indicate the
simplicity and brevity of statement -which the rules contemplate, and ver-
batim use of one of the forms of complaint does not obviate the require-
ment that claims for relief shall contain a statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.
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